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Abstract 
Crime in the digital world has become a daily occurrence. Criminals adopt to new tech-
nologies with a faster pace than we are, people defending against new threats, giving them 
the advantage against unsuspecting victims. Their advantage is not due to their superior-
ity; Offense has to succeed only once to be considered successful while defence has to 
succeed every single time to not be considered a failure.  
Defending successfully against multiple threats using innovative technologies is hard and 
can only be achieved with careful planning and effective applying of knowledge acquired 
by examining those threats. Digital forensics is the epitome of this. Investigators need to 
have a firm grasp of up-to-date threats and how to locate and neutralize them. Memory 
forensics are the cornerstone of digital forensics. In recent years, memory acquisition and 
preservation of the state of a system when suspicious activity is undergoing, is the number 
one priority by every digital forensics investigator. To improve the capabilities of the 
investigator, in this thesis we examine the current threats associated with malware and 
the newly introduced technology of digital currencies, by proposing a series of enhance-
ments to one of the most complete set of tools for memory analysis, the Volatility Frame-
work. 
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1 Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Background  
 
This chapter will introduce the current trends in malware technologies, cybercrime eco-
nomics and digital currencies, the fight against cybercrime and the important role of dig-
ital forensics and malware analysis in this struggle. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Cybercrime is an ever-growing economy all over the world. Intel Corporation in 2014 
estimated that the annual cost of cybercrime to the global economy is more than $400 
billion [1], while other estimates claim losses of $575 billion or even a trillion US dollars 
annually [2][3]. To top this, many organizations and companies that are victims of such 
activity simply choose not to report cybercrimes to the authorities or the government, due 
to the nature of the crime and due to the fact that they do not know how this information 
is going to be used and interpreted by third parties; Doing so would most probably result 
in hurting their reputation and creating a notion of betrayal to their customers trust, thus 
leading to more economic damages. Since they have the option to keep the information 
to themselves and move on, they choose this solution in hope that they can survive the 
possible financial loss and resulting in the wide margin of the estimate losses mentioned 
earlier.  
To make things worse, cybercriminals were introduced in their mischievous efforts to  an 
unexpected ally; a solution to monetize their efforts in the most anonymous ways possi-
ble, digital currencies [4]. Although Bitcoin and other digital currencies were not invented 
in an effort to help and endorse such kind of behaviour, cyber crime is one of their top 
uses. Their high anonymity level and the almost non existing paper and digital trail they 
provide, resulted in cyber crime being one of their top uses. Moreover, automation and 
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luck of need of human interaction for transactions involving digital currencies have re-
sulted in the rise of software that tries to exploit this king of behaviour [5] [6]; Malware 
that occupies ones device usually without her knowledge in order to produce a digital 
currency or even worse, tries to steal digital currencies already residing on the device.  
 
According to a report from Trend Micro [7], a security and antivirus company, in 2013 
there was a rise of Bitcoin related malware in almost all major countries worldwide, with 
Japan and United States leading in infections rate as shown above. More recently sophis-
ticated software known as ransomware, upon infection encrypts the files of the user and 
requests to be paid a bitcoin ransom within a matter of days in order for the user to gain 
back access to his encrypted files [8] [9]. 
Fortunately, security and antivirus companies like Trend Micro are doing their best in 
order to protect users, either via specialized software like antivirus and antimalware, ei-
ther via sharing vital information on how to prevent and remove malicious software. 
However, the creators of said software, like in a cat and mouse game, are also trying to 
evolve their software in order to avoid being detected by antimalware solutions, making 
it really hard for victims to avoid paying [10] or both. This leads to rapid evolution of 
software from both perspectives, making it quite hard for an individual to keep up with 
all the techniques involved in fighting and creating advanced malware.  
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One can safely assume that sophisticated malware was not always the case. One of the 
first viruses, the Morris Worm [11] in November 1988, although exploiting vulnerabili-
ties in Unix sendmail, finger and exec software, did not actually take advantage of its 
success, since -according to its creator- its only purpose was to figure out how many 
devices were connected to the Internet by then, it was easy to stop and its source code is 
a couple of hundred lines [12] only. It was  In another case, according to a Microsoft 
report [13] one of the most well know cases of malware, the LoveLetter virus in 2000 
relied on social engineering techniques in order to propagate itself further; the user had 
to manually open a mail attachment which was send to her, which led to code execution 
and further spreading of the virus. On the other hand, Code Red in July 2001 did not 
require any human interaction for spreading since it was exploiting a bug in Microsoft’s 
software, Internet Information Services (IIS). Similarly, SQL Slummer [14] in 2003 re-
lied on a buffer overflow vulnerability existing in Microsoft SQL Server products to prop-
agate itself to almost every vulnerable server around the world within ten minutes upon 
its release, resulting to a slowdown of the whole Internet. In more recent years, in 2010 
we witnessed one of the most complicated and extremely sophisticated malware that was 
ever discovered and probably created as of now; Stuxnet [15] [16]. Stuxnet managed from 
tens of thousands of kilometres away to infect its highly specific and well guarded targets, 
the computers of a nuclear facility in Iran that were never connected to the Internet, while 
managing to remain undetected for enough time to create malfunctions in the program-
mable logic controllers that were responsible for controlling the machinery of the facility, 
in a manner that was confusing enough in order to avoid detection by well trained engi-
neers responsible for the well being of the faculty. 
When examining a malicious software, in order to fully understand its impact, there are 
multiple perspectives that need to taken under consideration. There are the more obvious 
ones; the creator of the software or attacker, whose purpose is to infect as many victims 
as possible, spread the infection as far as possible, in the least required time. Then, it is 
the defender, who is dedicated in stopping the malicious intents of the attacker either by 
preventing the original infection or by blocking its further propagation. Finally, the third 
perspective is the examiner, referring to the one responsible for finding out how a partic-
ular malware works, documenting its behaviour and providing as many valuable infor-
mation as possible for its neutralization. Usually the defender works in conjunction with 
the examiner or in some cases may be the same entity. 
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According to Kizza et all [17] “Computer forensics is the application of forensic science 
techniques to computer-based material. This involves the extraction, documentation, ex-
amination, preservation, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of the computer-based 
material to provide relevant and valid information as evidence in civil, criminal, admin-
istrative, and other cases”. Although computer forensics ultimate target is the presentation 
of evidence in court, in a well documented and scientifically approved manner, the simi-
larities of a computer forensic examiner’s ultimate goal compared to to the defender per-
spective that was mentioned earlier, are more than obvious: the defender acts as a forensic 
examiner would, with the only difference being that she –usually- will not have to present 
her findings in front of a judge. And as a computer forensic examiner, the defender has 
multiple areas of interest when dealing with a particular malware; from the connections 
it makes over the internet and the use of resources of the device it occupies to the files it 
uses to exploit the operating system and the RAM footprint it has while working in the 
background. 
1.3 Research Question  
 
In most of the aforementioned malware cases and generally every malware related case, 
careful examination of the infected device by specialized personnel will pinpoint the 
source of the problem, even in the case of extremely sophisticated malware like Stuxnet. 
This is a fact that the creators of the malicious software are aware of and try to counter-
attack by making it harder and harder for investigators to analyse interpret their software 
and its behaviour. There are multiple ways to achieve this, one of which is to make the 
software have the smallest possible footprint both while operating and after it has fulfilled 
its purpose. A reasonable way to achieve such kind of tactics is for the software to fully 
operate in RAM and never touch the hard disk or any other parts of the device that might 
lead to persistent storage. By fully operating in RAM, apart from being faster, the mal-
ware will be erased by simply turning off the device, leaving no traces to be found.  
The aim of this master thesis is to study and develop a way to examine traces of Bitcoin 
related malware that tries to implemented this scenario. More specifically, the creation of 
a plugin for an already acknowledged software in the computer forensics community, the 
Volatility Forensic Framework, will be introduced, in order to expand its capabilities for 
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the newly appeared Bitcoin malware family. Moreover, the behaviour of various types of 
Bitcoin related malware will be examined, along with proposed ways of confronting them 
in multiple operating systems.  
1.4 Methodology: Designing a Volatility Framework 
Plugin 
 
In order to achieve a thorough understanding of how the Bitcoin malware family operates 
and be able to counterattack it, a detailed Literature Review will take place, regarding 
malware in general and in more details malware related to Bitcoin and other digital cur-
rencies. Techniques of malware creation, propagation and avoidance of detection will be 
examined and more specifically those that are related to RAM will be put under scrutiny. 
Related malware samples for all major operating systems will be acquired via multiple 
sources like security companies (F-Secure, Symantec, etc.) or sites dedicated to malware 
analysis and malware samples like virusshare.com, http://vxheaven.org and 
http://openmalware.org. 
In addition, the functionality of Bitcoin, the technology behind it, the network infrastruc-
ture and the Bitcoin users operate, are going to be researched for us to be able to have a 
deep understanding of how a malware that tries monetize by taking advantage of Bitcoin. 
Alternative currencies and their structure will also be taken under consideration. 
More over, the Volatility Forensic Framework will be thoroughly studied via its official 
guide written by its creators [18], books closely related to malware analysis [19] [20] and 
multiple presentations of other researchers in conferences around the world [21] [22] 
[23][24], in order to make sure that a deep understanding of its inner workings is at hand 
and a useful plugin can be created, following their guides. Plugins of the framework writ-
ten by other users will be examined, while focusing specifically to those related to mal-
ware activity for every major operating system.  
Multiple Test Beds will be created and used in order to test Bitcoin related malware to 
various conditions and operating systems, study their behaviour which will ultimately 
lead to valuable assumptions about their operation and ways to detect them. Linux and 
OSX will serve as hosts for multiple Virtual Machines running on top of them and having 
as guests at least two versions of each major operating system being in use today, with 
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multiple snapshots for every one of them, in various stages of their infection and opera-
tions in order to collect as much information as possible regarding the behaviour of 
Bitcoin malware. Along with the Virtual Machines Snapshots, a number of memory 
dumps will be acquired which will be analysed using the Volatility Forensic Framework. 
The proposed plugin will be heavily depended on the data acquired in the previous step. 
Relations and common patterns in the analysis of all the malware samples used will help 
the implementation. Python related literature [25] [26] will help overcome any difficulties 
that may arise. 
Finally, the evaluation of the plugin will be tested using the Test Beds mentioned earlier. 
Weaknesses and strong points will be pointed out and suggestions for further develop-
ment based on the experience acquired will be proposed.  
1.5 Thesis outline 
 
Each chapter of the dissertation and its contents will be outlined in order to provide the 
reader with a clear perspective and holistic view of the subject. 
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2 Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
This chapter is dedicated to a thorough literature review related to the evolution of mal-
ware, digital currencies and more specifically Bitcoin, the Volatility Memory Forensics 
Framework and its plugins. An examination of the most significant books, research pa-
pers, major conference presentations and hands-on trainings was performed in order to 
gain an insight on the past and current trends of said technologies and their applications. 
The most significant findings are presented next. 
2.1 Digital Currencies 
 
In 2008 a paper written by Satoshi Nakamoto [27], a alias of an as of yet unknown person, 
introduced the idea of a peer-to-peer electronic currency that would allow transactions 
from one party to another without the need of a 3rd party financial institution taking veri-
fying said transaction. However, this introduces a problem; Without the existence of a 
trusted 3rd party one or both ends of the transaction parties may double spend their funds. 
Nakamoto’s proposed solution is the hashing of all transaction that are time stamped and 
verified by the network and then saved in an ongoing hash-based proof-of-work record 
that cannot be alternated. This electronic currency was named Bitcoin and was released 
as an open source software less than a year after the paper was published[28]. 
 
2.1.1 Definition and functionality 
 
Bitcoin is the cornerstone of a series of technologies that are encapsulated into it. Its 
foundation is pure mathematics. Cryptography and computer networks are of great usage 
for Bitcoin. To make it clear of how Bitcoin works we will introduce an example of two 
users, Alice and Bob who would like to make a transaction.  
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Alice wants to transfer some Bitcoins to Bob, either because she bought something from 
him or she owns him some money. The main condition is that Alice has to make sure that 
Bob can accept Bitcoins, meaning that he has the appropriate means to do so. What Alice 
does when she sends Bob some Bitcoins, is sending him a series of numbers that have 
some certain mathematical attributes that make them hard to track, considering that there 
may be a malicious user, Eve, that wants to defraud the system in a number of ways, like 
as mentioned previously, double spending. This transaction like every other transaction 
is verified by the Bitcoin network, creating a permanent record binding it to the digital 
signature of Alice, a unique attribute given to every Bitcoin user in the network. For Alice 
to achieve the transaction she either has to use a special software called a Bitcoin client 
or use a service that can deal with the mechanics of the transaction (i.e. produce those 
numbers Alice will send) for her. From Bob’s perspective, he too has to meet the same 
conditions; He has to have a Bitcoin client or use a service that will deal with Bitcoin 
transactions on his behalf. 
One might wonder what Bob can do with the Bitcoins he receives from Alice. The obvi-
ous answer is that he can use them in order to acquire products or services from users or 
companies that they also accept Bitcoins. The other option is to exchange them for a 
physical currency of his choice via Bitcoin exchange services123. The value of a Bitcoin 
fluctuates in any given time, with the current rate being at 389 US Dollars at the time this 
lines were written. As stated earlier, Bitcoin transactions have some unique attributes 
when compared to transactions made with physical currency and these attributes may be 
the reason someone would want to use Bitcoin[29].  
• Absence of 3rd party financial institution or services. It can lead to an increase of 
cost per transaction and add time consuming activities 
• Privacy. Bitcoin transactions are pseudo anonymous4  and private. Users making 
a transaction are certain that no other party can verify reliably that a transaction 
has taken place amongst them. 
• Open source. Everyone can engage in Bitcoins transactions without the need of 
verification from 3rd parties (i.e. a bank) or knowledge of specific technical de-
tails. 
                                                
1 https://www.coinbase.com/ 
2 https://www.kraken.com/ 
3 https://www.bitstamp.net/ 
4 http://www.coindesk.com/how-anonymous-is-bitcoin/ 
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•  Bitcoin is decentralized. When Alice sends Bob a Bitcoin, the transactions does 
not go through a 3rd party. As a result, there is no entity that can control the money 
supply or can seize the assets of a user or even reverse a transaction that has al-
ready taken place. 
While decentralization may seem to have some disadvantages due to the absence of fi-
nancial institutions that provide the security and verification of every transaction, this 
functionality is provided via the hash-based proof of work record that is shared via the 
peer-to-peer Bitcoin network. 
 
 
Figure 2-1, Bitcoin transactions verification schema [27] 
 
One important part of the Bitcoin network and generally the whole ecosystem are the 
miners. Those are the users that participate in the network by providing computer power 
that is used in order to verify the unique attributes of every transaction that is being made 
and after validating that they are indeed legitimate, store the records of said transaction 
to the permanent record distributed to everyone which is called a transaction block. While 
validating transactions, miners will also add a record of their work, a proof of work, the 
verification of each transaction they achieved, which will result to a reward for them for 
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all the work they provided. Moreover, miners will add to the transaction block an encod-
ing of the previous valid transaction so as to achieve a level of continuity for the whole 
record shared by everyone in the network.  
 
2.1.2 Types of Digital Currencies 
 
Since the introduction of Bitcoin in 2009, thanks to its open source nature and the en-
dorsement of its developer for creating forks5 of its source code a number of alternative 
digital currencies have emerged, all based on the same principles. 
 
• Litecoin6. A digital currency similar to Bitcoin developed in 2011 by Charles Lee, 
a former Google engineer [30]. The major difference from Bitcoin in the hashing 
algorithm implemented for the verification of the transactions. The exchange rate 
at the time this lines were written was 3.3 US Dollars to 1 Litecoin 
• Darkcoin7. Created in 2013, its main focus is anonymity. As mentioned earlier, 
Bitcoin is pseudo anonymous and Darkcoin by mixing up transaction records and 
not providing the continuity used in Bitcoin, makes it harder to track the parties 
involved[31].  The exchange rate at the time these lines were written was 2.44 US 
Dollars to 1 Darkcoin. 
• Dogecoin8. Introduced in 2013 and according to its creator Billy Markus its main 
purpose being the introduction of a digital currency with greater demographic that 
Bitcoin. As a result, while also using the same principles of Bitcoin, contrary to 
its predecessor and the cap of total Bitcoins that will ever be produced set to 
twenty-one million, Dogecoin has already more than 100 billion coins into circu-
lation with more than 5 billion added each year. Due to this, the exchange rate at 
the time this lines were written was 0.13 US Dollars to 1000 Dogecoins. 
 
                                                
5 https://help.github.com/articles/fork-a-repo/ 
6 https://litecoin.org/ 
7 https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=421615.0 
8 http://dogesilo.dogecanabank.info/ 
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Those are some of the well know digital currencies existing. There is a vast majority of 
them, introducing slight changes to the core functions of Bitcoin. As of mid 2015 there is 
not a digital currency with deviations to the principles introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto 
in his original paper[27] [32]. 
 
2.1.3 Present Status 
 
Since 2009 and its introduction, Bitcoin has an increasing popularity, growing bigger by 
the day. Started by basically having no value in 2009 and an exchange rate of one US 
cent per Bitcoin in 2010, it has come to have an average exchange rate of more that 300 
US dollars in 2015. 
 
Figure 2-2, Bitcoin exchange rate in US dollars from March 2015 to December 2015 
Major companies like Dell9 and services like Paypal10 have adopted Bitcoin as an alter-
native payment method for its tuition fees11, the University of Nicosia is accepting Bitcoin 
as a payment method, while blockchain technology is being investigated as a foundation 
for financial transactions all over the world[32]. 
However, like every other technology, Bitcoin due to privacy attributes has risen to be 
the preferred way of payment in cyber crimes. From sites selling illegal substances[33], 
money laundering[34] to botnets used for illegal mining[5][7] and malware that encrypts 
the contents of hard drivers demanding ransom for their decryption[9], Bitcoin is always 
present. 
                                                
9 www.dell.com/bitcoin 
10https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/breaking-paypal-merchants-can-now-accept-
bitcoin/ 
11 http://www.unic.ac.cy/digitalcurrency 
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2.2 Bitcoin Malware 
 
Gaining attraction has always its downsides and Bitcoin is not an exception to this rule. 
Since early 2013, when for the first time its exchange rate value was equal to a couple 
hundreds of US dollars, criminal activity targeting the Bitcoin ecosystem evolved and 
started targeting users of the Bitcoin network[6]. As users along with the vendors of op-
erating systems and security software adapted to this new status quo by implementing a 
series of antimalware techniques and by making available information regarding mali-
cious activity related to Bitcoin and how to avoid it, malicious users evolved too; By late 
2013 new techniques implementing Bitcoin related malware emerged[9]. 
 
2.2.1 Definition 
 
Oxford dictionary defines malware as a “software which is specifically designed to dis-
rupt or damage a computer system”12. Malware related to Bitcoin clearly falls into this 
category of malicious software. Although there are not any known cases of computer 
systems that were damaged due infections from malware related to Bitcoin, the disruption 
of usage is the epitome of any related malware. Since 2013 where the price of Bitcoin 
started to rise (see earlier in this chapter13) criminal activity related to Bitcoin is on the 
rise and can be divided into two main categories; Illegal mining and ransomware. 
 
 
                                                
12 https://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/malware 
13 Chapter 2, Present Status 
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2.2.2 Types of Malware 
 
Mining was the first practice of the Bitcoin ecosystem targeted by malicious users. Usu-
ally the unsuspected victim would install a software that came with bundled with miner. 
The miner would replicate itself into the system, register itself as a service or set a flag to 
start on every boot of the system and would mine for Bitcoins. Periodically would connect 
to a dedicated command server set by the developer of the malware, report or send the 
results of his mining activity and fetch new data for further mining. This would go on as 
long as the user did not notice its presence or the remote server was shut down. 
There are many variations of this type of activity. For example, the miner is set to occupy 
only a maximum percent of the resources of the system he resides, in order to avoid de-
tection for longer periods. The miner can also be setup to update itself daily via a web site 
or a server so as to avoid detection of an updated security software or a patched operating 
system. 
Bitcoin mining on home computers is no longer a profitable activity even if the system is 
a state-of-the-art computer. Bitcoin mining has moved on to using dedicated application 
specific intergraded circuits (ASICs)14, that exceed by far the power of any computer 
system a typical user might operate. Even in the case of a large botnet of thousands of 
bots, Bitcoin mining might not be the top priority for a malicious user considering the 
value-for-money ratio he can achieve. 
However, even though it is well known that illegal home computer mining isn’t worth the 
risk, there are still stories of malware related to it, even by legitimate companies who fall 
victims of rogue employees bundling miners into legitimate software[35].  
Since mining is no longer the case for criminals, a different scheme related to Bitcoin has 
emerged in early 2014; Ransomware. A type of malware that encrypts a set of specific 
files or in some cases the whole hard drive and afterwards warns the user that she has to 
pay a ransom in Bitcoins within a short period of time usually of about 72 hours, in order 
to receive the decryption key of her files[9] [36]. 
These two kinds of Bitcoin malware are mainly targeting Microsoft Windows operating 
systems. Despite the fact that Bitcoin clients and Bitcoin miners are available for all three 
major operating system platforms (Windows, Linux, OS X), the overwhelming majority 
                                                
14https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/ASIC 
-14- 
of malware is developed for Microsoft’s platform. Although there are recent cases of 
miners targeting Linux and OS X or the even more rare ransomware developed for these 
two operating systems, the ratio is disproportionally higher on behalf of Windows. 
 
2.2.3 Evolution and Present Status 
 
Unfortunately ransomware malware infections that mostly rely on social engineering15 
has proven to be lucrative for the its developers, resulting in more complicated attacks 
and updated versions of said malware; According to a research paper by Symantec in 
2012 more that 5 million US dollars were extorted by the victims of such kind of malware 
in the United States alone[37]. As of late 2015 due to the efficient use of cryptography by 
the criminals, ransomware is still one of the most dangerous malware infections. 
On the other hand, mining since it is no longer a lucrative business model for the crimi-
nals, has declined in volume, with the news stories like a miner for Linux focusing mostly 
on the fact that the miner was developed for a platform other than Windows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15http://www.csoonline.com/article/2124681/leadership-management/security-aware-
ness-social-engineering-the-basics.html 
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2.3 Memory Forensics 
 
Memory acquisition has evolved to become the first step every forensic investigator and 
malware analyst makes when examining a system. When in a criminal investigation case 
failure to perform such a step may lead to the dismissal of the case[38]. Memory analysis 
is what follows the acquisition; The examination of the memory stored in a non-volatile 
manner, preserving evidence of activity present at the system at the time. A series of tools 
have been developed for all major operating systems and architectures in order to acquire 
and extract everything related to memory from a system. The analysis and interpretation 
of data residing on those files can be performed from a series of tools, one of which is the 
Volatility Framework, presented in Chapter 3. 
 
2.3.1 Forensic Tools 
 
This is a list of software tools that be used in order to acquire the memory of a system. 
The list in not complete and in no particular order, since unlike the state of hard disk 
acquisition software, there are no formal specifications that must be complied and thus 
be evaluated against them as a memory acquisition software developer. However there is 
a research paper regarding by S.Vömel and Stüttgen[39], introducing a platform for the 
evaluation of said software.  
The main idea behind this type of memory acquisition is loading a module into the kernel 
which helps the software map the desired physical addresses of tasks running on the sys-
tem into the virtual address space and then acquire the date from the virtual address space 
and store it to a storage device like a hard disk or a memory stick[18].  
 
• Belkasoft Live RAM Caputer 16. A free tool that according to the developer works 
in kernel-mode allowing it to bypass proactive anti-debugging protections. 
                                                
16 http://belkasoft.com/ram-capturer 
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• WindowsSCOPE Cyber Forensics17, a memory acquisition suite that can also be 
used for analysis. 
• mdd18. A memory acquisition tool for imaging Windows based computers offi-
cially supporting Windows versions up to Vista, but is also working on Windows 
7. 
• Memoryze19. Another free tool that supports capturing and analyzing memory. 
According to its developer it does not rely on API calls, allowing it to capture 
the full range of memory. 
• KnTTools20. A tool for acquiring memory from Windows based systems. 
•  MoonSols Windows Memory Toolkit21. A toolkit containing all the utilities 
needed to perform any kind of memory acquisition or conversion during an inci-
dent response, or a forensic analysis for Windows platforms. 
• FTK Imager22. A free tool supporting both x86 and x64 architectures of all ma-
jor operating systems. 
• Pmem Memory acquisition suite23. A series of tools for capturing memory from 
Windows (WinPmem) , Linux(LinPmem) and OS X (OSXPmem) by using a 
signed kernel module/driver in order to acquire the full range of memory of each 
system. 
• LiME24. According to its developer, “a loadable kernel module (LKM) which al-
lows for volatile memory acquisition from Linux and Linux-based devices, in-
cluding Android”. 
• Second Look Professional Edition25. A commercial product dedicated to 
memory acquisition from Linux based systems. 
• fmem26. Another Linux kernel module, similar to LiME. It must be complied 
and loaded to the kernel of the system for memory acquisition. Its development 
has stoppen in 2010. 
• Goldfish27. A memory acquisition tool over a FireWire connection, for OS X. 
 
In case of virtualisation solutions, memory acquisition is usually provided by the devel-
opers. For example, Qemu and Xen allow the dumping of the contents of memory and 
VMware files can be analysed natively by the Volatility Framework. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
17 http://www.windowsscope.com/ 
18 http://sourceforge.net/projects/mdd/ 
19 https://www.fireeye.com/services/freeware/memoryze.html 
20 http://www.gmgsystemsinc.com/knttools/ 
21 http://www.moonsols.com/windows-memory-toolkit/ 
22 http://accessdata.com/product-download/?/support/adownloads#FTKImager 
23 http://www.rekall-forensic.com/docs/Tools/ 
24 https://github.com/504ensicslabs/lime 
25 https://secondlookforensics.com/linux-incident-response/ 
26 https://onyx.koli.ch/get/4480/fmem_current.tgz 
27 http://digitalfire.ucd.ie/?page_id=430 
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2.3.2 Importance of Memory Forensics 
 
Throughout the history of digital forensics from early ‘80s to this day, there is a notable 
shift of thinking regarding the way a forensic investigator must operate when dealing with 
a crime scene involving a computer; One of the first steps he was required to take was the 
unplugging of the system from the network, in order to disrupt any effort of destroying 
digital evidence. This has changed; An investigator is now required to preserve the state 
of the system at all costs, in order to acquire as much evidence as possible.  
This is a strong indicator that a great deal of system information in a volatile state and 
shutting it down or alternating its state like for example disconnecting it from the network 
may lead to loss of a huge portion of evidence. 
Digital criminal activity has also shifted towards this direction; Advanced malware, like 
Stuxnet and Duqu[16][15], are operating in the memory of the system they infect. Per-
forming a memory capture of a system ensures that the entire state of said system along 
with all the running applications including all the related data structures and variables is 
preserved in a non-volatile storage and can be investigated at will, without the eminent 
threat of alternating or loosing evidence. 
Apart from malware that may only run in the memory of the system it infects, there is 
also the case of traditional malware that despite the fact that it resides on non-volatile 
storage it manages to hide its presence by injecting code to monitoring tools. While it 
may hide its presence it cannot hide its activity which at some point will rely on the 
memory of the system to achieve its goals. A memory capture while the malware operates 
will result in a number of indicators revealing its malicious purposes. 
In other words, memory acquisition and memory analysis have come to be a crucial part 
of digital forensics and rightly so. 
 3 Chapter 3 - The Volatility 
Framework 
In this chapter the Volatility Memory Forensics Framework is going to be analysed. A 
detailed overview of its features and structure is going to be presented in order for the 
reader to acquire an insight of its inner workings, its importance in the field of computer 
forensics and the ongoing development it undergoes. Moreover, notable plugins created 
by the open source community to expand its functionality are going to be presented. Fi-
nally, details about the test environment that is going to be used for the investigation of 
Bitcoin malware infections will be introduced along with software that accompanies this 
investigation. 
3.1 Definition 
 
The Volatility Framework is a complete collection of open source tools written in Python 
[40] [41] under the GNU General Public License for extracting and analysing digital ar-
tifacts from volatile memory (RAM) samples of multiple operating systems, acquired via 
3rd party software. This extraction and analysis of the volatile memory is performed sep-
arately of the original system giving the investigator a great advantage considering that 
RAM constitutes a crucial and vital part of the runtime of a system [42]. 
3.2 Brief History and Overview 
 
The Volatility Framework was firstly introduced in 2007, in one of the most important 
computer security conferences in the world that was taking pace in Washington DC at the 
time [43]. A. Walters and N. Petroni argued about the integral role of volatile memory 
analysis in digital forensics investigation process and the advantages it can provide to the 
forensics investigator. Moreover, they stressed the point of keeping multiple snapshots of 
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RAM and avoid performing a digital investigation on a live target when there are alter-
native solutions arguing that such practice will can alter the state of the device and thus 
become an obstacle to the investigation itself. To prove this, they created two virtual ma-
chines and monitored the state of their volatile memories for changes while they were 
idle. The results are shown in Table 3-1 that follows. 
Table 3-1, Bytes of physical memory that changed as a function of time [43] 
 
  
Then, they proceeded in introducing Volatools, the software that will later become the 
Volatility Framework.  
Up until their presentation every digital forensics investigation was focused on artifacts 
located on hard disks and other similar, permanent storage type devices. The volatile 
memory of the system was not taken under consideration although it almost certainly 
contains valuable information about the runtime of this very system and in some cases 
like the Stuxnet malware that were mentioned earlier in this thesis or the TrueCrypt en-
cryption suite and its encryption keys, it contains the only artifacts that can lead to a suc-
cessful forensic investigation. 
The concept was welcomed by the digital forensics community and the software later to 
become the Volatility Framework, was embraced by developers and volunteers around 
the world due to its open source nature; It provided a cross-platform, modular and exten-
sible platform that encouraged further work into a field that was making its first steps in 
the digital forensics era [41]. Since then, the Volatility Framework has evolved to one of 
the most highly used forensic tools and is being developed in a rapid pace with thousands 
of code commits. Its core developers have written a book dedicated solely to Volatility 
Framework [18], they perform trainings and have founded the Volatility Foundation, a 
non profit organization which was established to promote the usage of Volatility, protect 
its intellectual properties and help the advancement of memory forensics [41] 
  -21- 
 
 
Figure 3-1, Code commits as shown in github.com, a code repository and the ongoing 
development of the Volatility Framework 
 
3.3 Structure and Functionality 
 
The Volatility Framework in not the only memory forensics application. However, its 
features make it unique. Some of its core features according to its developers that makes 
it an ideal choice when it comes to memory forensics [18]:  
• A single, cohesive framework. It can analyze memory snapshots originating from 
versions of all major operating systems of today like:  
o 64-bit Windows Server 2012 and 2012 R2 
o 32-bit and 64-bit Windows 8 and 8.1 
o 32-bit and 64-bit Windows 10 
o 32- and 64-bit Windows 7 (all service packs) 
o 32- and 64-bit Windows Server 2008 (all service packs) 
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o 64-bit Windows Server 2008 R2 (all service packs) 
o 32- and 64-bit Windows Vista (all service packs) 
o 32- and 64-bit Windows Server 2003 (all service packs) 
o 32- and 64-bit Windows XP (SP2 and SP3) 
o 32- and 64-bit Linux kernels from 2.6.11 to 3.5 
o 32-bit 10.5.x Leopard (the only 64-bit 10.5 is Server, which isn't sup-
ported) 
o 32- and 64-bit 10.6.x Snow Leopard 
o 32- and 64-bit 10.7.x Lion 
o 64-bit 10.8.x Mountain Lion (there is no 32-bit version) 
o 64-bit 10.9.x Mavericks (there is no 32-bit version) 
 
along with all recent versions of Linux and in addition to memory snapshots of 
32bit versions of Android, the mobile operating system of 80% of all mobile 
phones in the world [44]. 
• It is open source under the GNU General Public License v2, which means that it 
is completely free for everyone and gives access to its source code to every inter-
ested party. 
• Python is the language used for its development. A well established programming 
language in the engineering and forensic world, easy to learn with huge potential 
while maintaining the easy-to-use mentality that it promotes. 
• An extensible and scriptable application programming interface (API) giving the 
ability to developers to extend its capabilities in whichever way they may require: 
automatically explore kernel memory, create your own custom plugin or write a 
new malware sandbox. 
• It is efficient. Volatility’s algorithms can analyze memory dumps from systems 
with 32 or 64 GB of RAM in a fraction of time while respecting the consumption 
of RAM of the system the analysis is performed. 
• The community behind it apart from amateurs and individuals, has members com-
ing from a law enforcement background like the Department of Justice of the 
United States, international companies like Google and Facebook, as well as the 
majority of antivirus and computer security firms. 
The Volatility Framework supports multiple inputs for analysis [45]:  
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• Raw/Padded Physical Memory 
• Firewire (IEEE 1394) 
• Expert Witness (EWF) 
• 32- and 64-bit Windows Crash Dump 
• 32- and 64-bit Windows Hibernation 
• 32- and 64-bit MachO files 
• Virtualbox Core Dumps 
• VMware Saved State (.vmss) and Snapshot (.vmsn) 
• HPAK Format (FastDump) 
• LiME (Linux Memory Extractor) 
• QEMU VM memory dumps 
 
Volatility is not a memory acquisition software. For this purpose, third party software 
should be used in order to acquire the memory dumps of a target device. There are mul-
tiple solutions for this purpose, while different operating systems require different soft-
ware to achieve this. For Microsoft Windows there are solutions like MoonSols Windows 
Memory Toolkit [46] with free and retail versions, supporting 32bit and 64bit versions of 
Windows, compatible up to Windows 8.1.  
For OSX there is OSXPmem [47], the Mac OS X Physical Memory acquisition tool which 
can capture memory dumps from versions 10.6 up to the most recent 10.11, while it pri-
marily focused on 64bit versions of the operating system. 
For Linux, depending on the version, there are also multiple solutions. The most common 
tool used is the Linux Memory Extractor  (LiME) [48], a Loadable Kernel Module 
(LKM), which allows the acquisition of volatile memory from Linux and Linux-based 
devices. This last characteristic also makes it ideal for memory acquisition on Android 
devices, since Android is a Linux-based operating system. For older versions of Linux it 
is possible to capture the critical parts of memory by using the program dd [49] and coping 
the contents of the /dev/mem/ directory, a characteristic that has been deprecated in more 
recent versions. 
As mentioned earlier, the Volatility Framework is implemented in Python. However, 
most of operating systems and the applications that run on them are primarily using the 
C programming language, with myriad uses of data structures in order to organize related 
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variables and attributes [18]. In order for Volatility to translate all those C data structures 
in Python source files, it implements its own data structures, called VTypes. According to 
the authors of The Art of Memory Forensics, with VTypes one “can define structures 
whose member names, offsets, and types all match the ones used by the operating system 
one is analyzing, so that when she finds an instance of the structure in a memory dump, 
Volatility knows how to treat the underlying data (i.e., as an integer, string, or pointer).” 
[18][21] 
This is an example of a C data structure and the equivalent VType for Volatility, written 
in Python: 
 
struct process  
{ int pid; 
int parent_pid; 
char name[10]; 
char * command_line;  
void * ptv; 
}; 
 
In this case, there are two integers, an array of characters, a pointer to a string and a void 
pointer. The translation of the above data structure to a VType data structure for use in 
Volatility Framework is as follows: 
 
'process' : [ 26, { 
'pid' : [ 0, ['int']], 
'parent_pid' : [ 4, ['int']], 
'name' : [ 8, ['array', 10, ['char']]],  
'command_line' : [ 18, ['pointer', ['char']]],  
'ptv' : [ 22, ['pointer', ['void']]], 
}] 
 
Here, the name of the structure is declared (‘process’) which is the first dictionary key 
and it is accompanied by its size, which in this case is equal to 26. Then we proceed 
declaring the attributes of each member of the structure, their types and offsets. For ex-
ample, the pointer to the string (‘command line’) is at offset 18 and its type is pointer.  
This is done for all the data structures of an operating system which, as mentioned earlier, 
are myriads and usually change from version to version of a single operating system or 
even by its updates, let alone amongst different editions. Fortunately, there are ways to 
  -25- 
automate this process for most of the data structures existing in an operating system. For 
example, there is pdbparse [50] [51], a software that can be used to generate VTypes from 
the proprietary format of Microsoft’s debugging symbols and thus be used in Volatility 
Framework. In other cases, when the data structures cannot be automatically produced, 
they must be manually developed after reverse engineering of specific parts of the oper-
ating system takes place. 
Another important part of Volatility’s inner workings are overlays. Referring to the data 
structure mentioned earlier28, the use of void pointers is more than common in operating 
systems. Void pointers –in this case ptv- are used when the data type they point to is 
unknown at the time of the allocation. Overlays are used to fix up or patch automatically 
generated structure definitions when those type of pointers exist. The overlay that will be 
used in order to patch the ptv pointer when for example we know that it points to a pro-
cess, has this structure[18]: 
 
'process' : [ None, { 
'ptv' : [ None, ['pointer', ['process']]], 
} 
 
The ‘None’ attributes are used to point out that there should be no change regarding the 
offset and the size of the pointer, while ‘void’ becomes ‘process’ after the patch, indicate 
that the pointer from now on refers to a process. 
A Volatility object is another crucial part of its core structure; According to the developers 
[18] [45], “it is an instance of a structure that exists at a specific address within an address 
space (AS)29. An object class gives the user the ability to extend the functionality of an 
object. In other words, she can attach methods or properties to an object that then become 
accessible to all instances of the object”. As a result, plugins can share the same code, 
making their development a lot easier.  
The combination of VTypes, ovelays and object classes that are derived from a specific 
operating system version including the hardware architecture, constitute the profile of this 
version of the operating system. Along with these characteristics, a profile includes the 
following:  
                                                
28 See page 14 
29 The total amount of memory that is allocated for a process 
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• Metadata: Information regarding the operating system’s name, kernel version 
number, etc. 
• System call information: Indexes and names of system calls 
• Constant values: Global variables that can be found at hard-coded addresses in 
some operating systems 
• Native types: Low-level types for native languages (usually C), including the sizes 
for all variable types 
• System map: Addresses of critical global variables and functions (this information 
exists only in Linux and OSX profiles) 
Profiles are necessary for correctly analyzing memory dumps and are already created for 
most of the versions and hardware architectures of all major operating systems. They can 
also be build and integrated into the framework manually. 
 One more major aspect of the Volatility framework are the plugins and the mechanisms 
they implement. The reason they are employed is the expansion of the existing capabili-
ties of the framework in ways that differ from its original ones. For example, the support 
of newer CPU architectures can be achieved by an address space30 plugin, whilst an anal-
ysis plugin is used to locate and analyze different components of an operating system, a 
malicious application, etc. 
The basic plugin architecture of the latter according to the authors of The Art of Memory 
Forensics is a Python class that inherits from commands .Command which results in over-
riding some of the base methods like calculate and render_text. The first one and the code 
that it encapsulates is responsible for parsing the memory dump and analyzing any objects 
it locates, while render_text is used to pass the results of this analysis and present them 
on the terminal [18][41]. Following is a sample analysis plugin [52] for identifying the 
processes of a system which RAM has been acquired. 
 
import volatility.utils as utils  
import volatility.commands as commands  
import volatility.win32.tasks as tasks 
class ExamplePlugin(commands.Command):  
 """This is an example plugin""" 
 def calculate(self): 
                                                
30 An interface that provides flexible and consistent access to data in RAM, it handles the 
translation of virtual to physical address and provides the necessary background for in-
terpreting differences in proprietary file formats 
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  """This method performs the work""" 
  addr_space = utils.load_as(self._config)  
  for proc in tasks.pslist(addr_space): 
   yield proc 
 def render_text(self, outfd, data): 
  """This method formats output to the terminal. 
  :param outfd | <file> 
    data | <generator> 
 """ 
 for proc in data: 
  outfd.write("Process: {0}\n".format(proc.ImageFileName)) 
 
There are two possible ways of importing a plugin into the Volatility Framework and use 
it. Either copy the corresponding Python file into the plugins directory (/volatility/plugins) 
or direct Volatility to load the plugin by specifying its location via the - -plugins switch. 
In the first case, the framework will automatically load the plugin each time it is executed 
with no interference from the user, while on the latter case the user must point to the 
plugin every time. In both cases, multiple plugins can be used concurrently by simply 
adding them to the /plugins directory or declaring them manually by adding colons after 
each declaration (directory path to plugin1:directory path to plugin2:directory path to 
plugin3). All available plugins that are picked up automatically by the framework and are 
loaded upon its execution can be listed by passing the –info switch to the main Python 
script. 
Usage of the framework relies on the main Python script (vol.py) and switches that are 
passed to it via the command line. For example, in order to load a memory dump, one has 
to use the –f switch, followed by the directory that the file resides. In addition, the user 
must specify the operating system that the file was captured, the profile, that as mentioned 
earlier is a combination of VTypes, ovelays and object classes. If this information is not 
known, there is function that can be used prior to the analysis and determine the operating 
system. After this, additional options like plugin switches and arguments can be passed 
to the main python script for further analysis. 
 
python vol.py –f <FILENAME> --profile=<PROFILE> <PLUGIN> [ARGS] 
 
If the operating system profile information is not at the user’s disposal, the imageinfo 
plugin is used to retrieve it. Following is an example of such usage: 
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python vol.py -f zeus.vmem imageinfo 
The Volatility Framework will determine the most likely operating system that the file 
was created and present results similar to these: 
  
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.5 
INFO    : volatility.debug    : Determining profile based on KDBG search... 
Suggested Profile(s) : WinXPSP2x86, WinXPSP3x86 (Instantiated with 
WinXPSP2x86) 
AS Layer1 : IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel AS) 
AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/Users/Thesis/Memory Dumps/zeus.vmem) 
PAE type : PAE 
DTB : 0x319000L 
KDBG : 0x80544ce0L 
Number of Processors : 1 
Image Type (Service Pack) : 2 
KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xffdff000L 
KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffdf0000L 
Image date and time : 2010-08-15 19:17:56 UTC+0000 
Image local date and time : 2010-08-15 15:17:56 -0400 
 
In this case, the capture of memory contents was performed on a Windows XP SP2 x86 
system and was correctly identified by the framework as it can be seen by the suggested 
profiles option. From now on the analysis of this sample will be performed by passing the 
corresponding profile to the main python file of Volatility: 
python vol.py -f zeus.vmem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 sockets 
 
which results to the analysis shown below:  
 
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.5 
Offset(V)       PID   Port  Proto Protocol        Address         Create Time 
---------- -------- ------ ------ --------------- --------------- ----------- 
0x80fd1008        4      0     47     GRE                0.0.0.0          2010-08-11 06:08:00 UTC+0000 
0xff258008      688    500  17     UDP               0.0.0.0           2010-08-11 06:06:35 UTC+0000 
0xff367008        4      445   6      TCP                0.0.0.0           2010-08-11 06:06:17 UTC+0000 
0x80ffc128      936    135   6      TCP                0.0.0.0           2010-08-11 06:06:24 UTC+0000 
0xff37cd28     1028   1058 6      TCP                0.0.0.0           2010-08-15 19:17:56 UTC+0000 
0xff20c478      856   29220 6    TCP              0.0.0.0           2010-08-15 19:17:27 UTC+0000 
0xff225b70      688     0    255   Reserved         0.0.0.0           2010-08-11 06:06:35 UTC+0000 
0xff254008     1028    123  17    UDP               127.0.0.1       2010-08-15 19:17:56 UTC+0000 
0x80fce930     1088   1025 17    UDP               0.0.0.0           2010-08-11 06:06:38 UTC+0000 
0xff127d28      216    1026  6     TCP                127.0.0.1       2010-08-11 06:06:39 UTC+0000 
0xff206a20     1148   1900  17    UDP              127.0.0.1       2010-08-15 19:17:56 UTC+0000 
0xff1b8250      688    4500  17    UDP              0.0.0.0           2010-08-11 06:06:35 UTC+0000 
0xff382e98        4      1033   6     TCP               0.0.0.0           2010-08-11 06:08:00 UTC+0000 
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0x80fbdc40        4      445   17    UDP              0.0.0.0            2010-08-11 06:06:17 UTC+0000 
 
 
In this case the sockets argument was passed which prints a list of open sockets on the 
systems at the time of the capture. Another core plugin that can be used is pstree which 
prints the process list tree of the system, along with information about the PID31, threads, 
handles and relationships: 
 
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.5 
Name                                                  Pid   PPid   Thds   Hnds Time 
-------------------------------------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ---- 
 0x810b1660:System                            4      0        58         379     1970-01-01 00:00:00 
UTC+0000 
. 0xff2ab020:smss.exe                      544      4         3          21       2010-08-11 06:06:21 
UTC+0000 
.. 0xff1ec978:winlogon.exe              632    544      24       536       2010-08-11 06:06:23 
UTC+0000 
... 0xff255020:lsass.exe                    688    632       21       405      2010-08-11 06:06:24 
UTC+0000 
... 0xff247020:services.exe               676    632      16       288       2010-08-11 06:06:24 
UTC+0000 
.... 0xff1b8b28:vmtoolsd.exe          1668    676      5         225       010-08-11 06:06:35 
UTC+0000 
..... 0xff224020:cmd.exe                  124    1668      0        ------      2010-08-15 19:17:55 
UTC+0000 
.... 0x80ff88d8:svchost.exe              856     676      29       336        2010-08-11 06:06:24 
UTC+0000 
.... 0xff1d7da0:spoolsv.exe            1432     676      14       145        2010-08-11 06:06:26 
UTC+0000 
.... 0x80fbf910:svchost.exe             1028    676     88       1424      2010-08-11 06:06:24 
UTC+0000 
..... 0x80f60da0:wuauclt.exe          1732    1028      7        189        2010-08-11 06:07:44 
UTC+0000 
..... 0x80f94588:wuauclt.exe            468    1028      4        142        2010-08-11 06:09:37 
UTC+0000 
..... 0xff364310:wscntfy.exe             888    1028      1        40          2010-08-11 06:06:49 
UTC+0000 
.... 0xff217560:svchost.exe               936    676     11        288         2010-08-11 06:06:24 
UTC+0000 
.... 0xff143b28:TPAutoConnSvc.e  1968    676      5        106         2010-08-11 06:06:39 
UTC+0000 
..... 0xff38b5f8:TPAutoConnect.e   1084   1968     1         68          2010-08-11 06:06:52 
UTC+0000 
.... 0xff22d558:svchost.exe              1088    676     7          93          2010-08-11 06:06:25 
                                                
31 Process Identifier, a unique number to identify an active process 
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UTC+0000 
.... 0xff218230:vmacthlp.exe            844     676      1         37          2010-08-11 06:06:24 
UTC+0000 
.... 0xff25a7e0:alg.exe                       216    676      8        120         2010-08-11 06:06:39 
UTC+0000 
.... 0xff203b80:svchost.exe              1148    676     15       217        2010-08-11 06:06:26 
UTC+0000 
.... 0xff1fdc88:VMUpgradeHelper  1788    676      5        112        2010-08-11 06:06:38 
UTC+0000 
.. 0xff1ecda0:csrss.exe                      608     544     10      410         2010-08-11 06:06:23 
UTC+0000 
 0xff3865d0:explorer.exe                1724    1708     13     326         2010-08-11 06:09:29 
UTC+0000 
. 0xff374980:VMwareUser.exe         452    1724      8      207        2010-08-11 06:09:32 
UTC+0000 
. 0xff3667e8:VMwareTray.exe          432   1724      1       60          2010-08-11 06:09:31 
UTC+0000 
 
Similarly, Volatility can be used to analyze files acquired from Apple’s Mac OS X family 
operating systems. In this case, there is an additional step one must make in order to 
properly configure the framework for such a task; the corresponding operating system 
profile must be added since it is not included by default. The Volatility Foundation main-
tains an active list of those profiles32. The user can download the profile she requires and 
paste the zip file to volatility/plugins/overlays/mac or volatility/plugins/overlays/linux di-
rectories, depending on the system the analysis refers to. In the example that follows, the 
OS X Yosemite 10.10.5 profile was used: 
python vol.py -f Yosemite.vmem --profile=MacYosemite_10_10_5_14F27x64 mac_arp 
The result can be shown in Figure 3-2 bellow. The plugin mac_arp was used in order to 
print the ARP table33 of the system 
 
 
Figure 3-2, Printing the ARP table of an OS X system 
                                                
32 https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/profiles 
33 A cache of the Address Resolution Protocol used for storing IP addresses and their 
resolved Ethernet physical addresses. 
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Another example is mac_dmesg which implements a well know command for UNIX-like 
operating systems, dmesg 
python vol.py –f Yosemite.vmem --profile=MacYosemite_10_10_5_14F27x64 mac_dmesg 
 
which is used to print the message buffer of the kernel: 
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.5 
x: svga: Start: FB size=0x300000, FIFO size=0x200000 
Apple16X50UARTSync1: Detected 16550AF/C/CF FIFO=16 MaxBaud=115200 
gfx: svga: Start: host_bpp=32, bpp=32, num_displays=1 
Apple16X50UARTSync2: Detected 16550AF/C/CF FIFO=16 MaxBaud=115200 
gfx: fb: start: maxWidth 1920 maxHeight 1080 vramSize 134217728 
gfx: fb: setDisplayMode: (1) wxh=1024x768, 32 4096 
gfx: svga: SetMode: mode w,h=1024, 768 bpp=32 
gfx: svga: SetMode: pitch=4096 
gfx: fb: setDisplayMode: Display ID=1, Depth ID=0 
gfx: fb: setDisplayMode: wxh=1024x768, bpp=32, pitch=4096 
gfx: gfx: UpdateTraces: Enabling traces. 
 
Previous shutdown cause: 0 
Waiting for DSMOS... 
0x1face000, 0x00000000  Intel82574L::setLinkStatus - not active 
0x1face000, 0x00000000  Intel82574L::setLinkStatus - not active 
0x1face000, 0x00000000  Intel82574L::setLinkStatus - not active 
0x1face000, 0x00000000  Intel82574L::setLinkStatus - not active 
0x1face000, 0x00000000  Intel82574L::setLinkStatus - not active 
Ethernet [Intel82574L]: Link up on en0, 1-Gigabit, Full-duplex, No flow-control, 
Debug [796d,ac08,01e1,0200,41e1,7c00] 
0x1face000, 0x0000000a  Intel82574L::setLinkStatus - active 
DSMOS has arrived 
[snip] 
In general, several of the command options supported by Volatility can used in conjunc-
tion with most of the plugins regardless of the file that is being analyzed. Included there 
is a help menu that can be displayed by passing the –help (or –h) argument: 
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.5 
Usage: Volatility - A memory forensics analysis platform. 
 
Options: 
  -h, --help            list all available options and their default values. 
                        Default values may be set in the configuration file 
                        (/etc/volatilityrc) 
  --conf-file=/Users/Gi0/.volatilityrc 
                        User based configuration file 
  -d, --debug           Debug volatility 
  --plugins=PLUGINS     Additional plugin directories to use (colon separated) 
  --info                Print information about all registered objects 
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  --cache-directory=/Users/Gi0/.cache/volatility 
                        Directory where cache files are stored 
  --cache               Use caching 
  --tz=TZ               Sets the (Olson) timezone for displaying timestamps 
                        using pytz (if installed) or tzset 
  -f FILENAME, --filename=FILENAME 
                        Filename to use when opening an image 
  --profile=WinXPSP2x86 
                        Name of the profile to load (use --info to see a list 
                        of supported profiles) 
  -l LOCATION, --location=LOCATION 
                        A URN location from which to load an address space 
  -w, --write           Enable write support 
  --dtb=DTB             DTB Address 
  --shift=SHIFT         Mac KASLR shift address 
  --output=text         Output in this format (support is module specific, see 
                        the Module Output Options below) 
  --output-file=OUTPUT_FILE 
                        Write output in this file 
  -v, --verbose         Verbose information 
  -g KDBG, --kdbg=KDBG  Specify a KDBG virtual address (Note: for 64-bit 
                        Windows 8 and above this is the address of 
                        KdCopyDataBlock) 
  --force               Force utilization of suspect profile 
  --cookie=COOKIE       Specify the address of nt!ObHeaderCookie (valid for 
                        Windows 10 only) 
  -k KPCR, --kpcr=KPCR  Specify a specific KPCR address 
 
Also in the help menu a list of plugins loaded by the framework and are available for 
use is show. 
3.4 Existing Plugins 
 
Plugins shown in the help menu of Volatility are a fraction of the whole list that is actually 
supported. This list of more than 250 plugins (see Appendix) for all major operating sys-
tems can be printed by passing the -- info argument: 
python vol.py -- info  
The functionality of those plugins cover a vast area of interest regarding forensic analysis. 
There are plugins for detect API34 hooks in process and kernel memory, reconstructing 
the a browser’s cache memory and history, connecting to the file via a shell or even for 
                                                
34 Application Program Interface 
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saving a pseudo-screenshot of what was on the screen of the user at the time by using the 
Windows GDI system35. 
Apart from the core plugins included by default in the framework, there are more that 
forty plugins that are developed and maintained by the Volatility community and are 
available to everyone36. Moreover, since 201337 and every year the Volatility Foundation 
is holding a contest for the top three plugins produced by members of the community, 
awarding them with various ways. For example, in 2013 a OS X rootkit detection plugin 
was introduced by Cem Gurkok [53]–[55]. Thanks to his work, Volatility is able to detect 
• Direct syscall table modification 
• Syscall function inlining (ie DTrace hooks) 
• Patching the syscall handler (ie, shadow sycall table) 
• Hooked functions in kernel/kext symbol tables 
• Modified IDT descriptors 
• Modified IDT handlers 
In 2014 he expanded the capabilities of his plugins by being able to identify and recover 
bitcoin keys and addresses (see Appendix), enumerating threads of tasks running on a 
Mac and detecting suspicious behavior regarding the TrustedBSD policy list [45]. An-
other useful feature of plugins is their ability to register their own options, which can be 
viewed by the --help or –h switches that can accompany a plugin. For example: 
python vol.py pstree --help 
 
will produce the following output: 
 
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.5 
Usage: Volatility - A memory forensics analysis platform. 
 
Options: 
 [snip] 
  --force               Force utilization of suspect profile 
  --cookie=COOKIE       Specify the address of nt!ObHeaderCookie (valid for 
                        Windows 10 only) 
  -k KPCR, --kpcr=KPCR  Specify a specific KPCR address 
 
                                                
35 Microsoft Windows Graphics Device Interface 
36 https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/community 
37 http://www.volatilityfoundation.org/#!2013/c19yz 
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Module Output Options: dot, greptext, html, json, sqlite, text, xlsx 
 
--------------------------------- 
Module PSTree 
--------------------------------- 
Print process list as a tree 
 
Along with the plugins list printed to the terminal by the --info argument, a list of the 
profiles that are supported (see Appendix), including those loaded manually like the OS 
X profile shown in a previous example is presented. In addition to these profiles, there 
are profiles for both x86 and x64 architectures of six major distributions of Linux38, in-
cluding Fedora, RedHat, Debian and OpenSUSE and more than sixty profiles for OS X 
version 10.5 and onwards39 
 
3.5 Plugin Case Studies 
 
In this section a number of case studies will be presented, regarding the functionality of 
the framework on analysing files captured from every major operating system today.   
 
3.5.1Windows 
 
One of the most complicated and advanced malware that was ever created is Stux-
net[15][16]. Its origins are yet to be know, but due to its extremely sophisticated nature it 
is believed to be a creation of a state or even a coalition of states. Its purpose was to 
sabotage Iran’s nuclear program by infecting PLCs40 of a specific nuclear factory in Iran 
in order to introduce malfunctions in a way that they would not be traceable, not even by 
the engineers working at the premises. It was using four different zero-day exploits[56] 
                                                
38 https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/profiles/tree/master/Linux 
39 https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/profiles/tree/master/Mac 
40 Programmable logic controller 
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for Microsoft’s Windows operating system and was designed in such elaborate way that 
it could reach its targets although they were not connected to the Internet. 
Since its discovery in 2010, Stuxnet has been analyzed by multiple digital investigators 
and samples are available from multiple sources41424344 for everyone interested to inves-
tigate further. In order to analyze the behavior of the malware with Volatility, a virtual 
machine using VMWare’s Workstation Pro45 software was created and later infected with 
Stuxnet. The captured memory file of this machine (stuxnet.vmem) is analyzed below. 
First step in analysis is the identification of the profile, a necessary option required by 
Volatility in order to perform accurate results. This can be achieved by the imageinfo 
plugin: 
python vol.py -f stuxnet.vmem imageinfo 
 
which produces the following output: 
 
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.5 
INFO    : volatility.debug    : Determining profile based on KDBG search... 
WARNING : volatility.debug    : Overlay structure tty_struct not present in vtypes 
          Suggested Profile(s) : WinXPSP2x86, WinXPSP3x86 (Instantiated with 
WinXPSP2x86) 
                     AS Layer1 : IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel AS) 
                     AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (stuxnet.vmem) 
                      PAE type : PAE 
                           DTB : 0x319000L 
                          KDBG : 0x80545ae0L 
          Number of Processors : 1 
     Image Type (Service Pack) : 3 
                KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xffdff000L 
             KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffdf0000L 
           Image date and time : 2011-06-03 04:31:36 UTC+0000 
     Image local date and time : 2011-06-03 00:31:36 -0400 
 
                                                
41 https://virusshare.com 
42 http://openmalware.org/ 
43 http://malshare.com/ 
44 http://malwarecookbook.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/stuxnet.vmem.zip 
45 https://www.vmware.com/products/workstation 
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As a result, the profile used for the rest of the analysis is the one for Windows XP SP3 
x86 operating system. One of the most common steps in a forensic analysis is the exam-
ination of the processes running on the system along with their handles, objects, modules, 
etc, while the memory capture was performed. This can be achieved by multiple plugins 
like pslist, pstree, handles and psxview. 
 
python vol.py –f stuxnet.vmem –profile= WinXPSP3x86 pstree 
 
which produces the output shown in Figure 3-3. By examining the tree of processes there 
is an out of the ordinary number of processes posing as lsass.exe, a system service in 
Microsoft Windows responsible for the Local Security Authority Subsystem46. On an un-
infected system there is only one instance of lsass.exe. Piping the result of Volatility to 
egrep47 will produce an even clearer output: 
 
python vol.py -f stuxnet.vmem -f stuxnet.vmem --profile=WinXPSP3x86 pstree | egrep 
'(lsass.exe)' 
 
By focusing the investigation on those suspicious instances of lsass.exe, more clues of 
malicious behavior are revealed.  
                                                
46 https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc961760.aspx 
47 http://linux.die.net/man/1/egrep 
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Figure 3-3, Executing the pstree plugin on a Stuxnet infected system 
One of the three instances has a start time in 2010 while the other two in 2011. Consider-
ing the fact that every other program has started in 2010, the latter instances of lsass.exe 
are definitely out of the order. 
Another common step when analyzing malicious samples is the examination of network 
connections of the operating system. This may not be a clear indication of malicious be-
havior since at the time the memory capture occurred there may be no network connec-
tions present. However, it is always a measure of good practice to take this step under 
consideration and use the connections plugin: 
 
python vol.py -f stuxnet.vmem -f stuxnet.vmem --profile=WinXPSP3x86 connections 
 
In this case, there are no network connections at the time the memory was captured. There 
is another plugin however that will help detect malicious behavior regarding connections  
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to a network, the sockets plugin, responsible for printing a list of open network sockets48. 
python vol.py -f stuxnet.vmem -f stuxnet.vmem --profile=WinXPSP3x86 sockets 
 
The output is shown in Figure 3-4 below. Again, there is no sign of malicious activity.  
 
Figure 3-4, Output of the connections plugin 
But in conjunction with the results of pstree this absence of some specific network ele-
ments is itself a sign of malicious activity; The highlighted socket in Figure 3-4 belongs 
to a process with a PID equal to one of the three instances of lsass.exe we noticed earlier. 
The process is listening to port 500 and 4500 which according to Microsoft is normal 
behavior. Thus, the two other instances of lsass.exe that do not experience such behavior 
are not acting as they should.  
Another indicator of a malicious process, especially in Windows systems, is the number 
of DLLs49 it is depending on for its functioning. Usually a typical program requires about 
40 DLLs or more. By using the dlllist plugin in Volatility to investigate the two suspicious 
instances of lsass.exe, we can print a list of loaded DLLs for each process. 
 
python vol.py -f stuxnet.vmem -f stuxnet.vmem --profile=WinXPSP3x86 -p 680 dlllist 
 
where –p 680 is the PID of the lsass.exe instance with timestamp in 2010. The result is 
64 DLLs which is to be expected. Running the plugin against the two other instances, the 
                                                
48 https://docs.oracle.com/javase/tutorial/networking/sockets/definition.html 
49 https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/815065 
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number is significantly lower; 15 and 35. Which is a third, strong indication that these 
processes are not legitimate. 
The next plugin we are going to execute against the sample is malfind50, a plugin dedi-
cated in locating and flagging patterns in memory that indicate malicious behavior. In 
order to target a specific process, we pass the corresponding PID(s) to malfind: 
 
vol.py -f stuxnet.vmem --profile=WinXPSP3x86 -p 868 malfind 
 
which produces this output: 
 
 
Figure 3-5, Executing malfind plugin against the malicious process 
According to the plugin there are areas in memory that are marked with READ, WRITE 
and EXECUTE permissions, as highlighted above. A normal, non-malicious executable 
must have READ and EXECUTE permissions and should not be able to write in any part 
                                                
50 https://code.google.com/p/volatility/wiki/CommandReferenceMal22#malfind 
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of the memory. Malfind also provided the ability to export the malicious content for fur-
ther analysis via a disassembler or antivirus services via the --dump-dir {directory} 
switch. In a similar pattern, there is the procdump plugin used for dumping a process to 
an executable file sample. 
Volatility provides another two core plugins that can help us pinpoint any files related to 
malware, modscan and moddump. The first one can be used to scan the sample for drivers 
and other kernel modules, while the latter can be used to export those for further analysis.  
 
Figure 3-6, Volatility plugin modscan into action 
The result is a long list of modules and drivers, a couple of whom are located in a non-
common location, as shown in Figure 3-6. Moddump plugin can be used to export them 
for further analysis. In addition, since we now hold a reference to the name of a possibly 
malicious driver, we can examine any references to it in the Windows Registry51, via the 
strings5253 program. 
 
strings stuxnet.vmem | grep mrx -i | grep HKLM54 
 
This will result to an output where everything related to Windows Registry will be printed 
and can be further manipulated again by piping the results to grep.  
 
python vol.py -f stuxnet.vmem printkey -K 'ControlSet001\Services\MrxNet' 
python vol.py -f stuxnet.vmem printkey -K 'ControlSet001\Services\MrxCls' 
                                                
51 https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/256986 
52 http://linux.die.net/man/1/strings 
53 https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/strings.aspx 
54 http://www.computerhope.com/jargon/h/hklm.htm 
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Finally, by using the printkey plugin which is used to print a registry key along with is 
values and subkeys, we can verify that Stuxnet starts executing every time the operating 
systems reboots by locating the appropriate registry key. 
 
3.5.2 Linux  
 
Linux may not be as popular target as Windows are when it comes to malware, but that 
should not be advocated as reason for Linux being a platform with complete lack of mal-
ware. On the contrary due to the fact that Linux is installed in the majority of servers on 
the Internet[57] and Google’s Android, which is based on Linux, has became the most 
used operating system globally[58][44], instances of malware are on the rise and forensic 
analysis tools should be prepared. 
Volatility has more that 65 plugins dedicated to memory captures that are derived from 
Linux. The list of those plugins can be printed by grepping the info output for linux: 
 
python vol.py --info | grep linux 
Following we are going to demonstrate the usage of some of those plugins to a memory 
capture taken from a system running Centos 6.3 x6455. 
Just like the previous case study when examining a Windows memory capture, we start 
by enumerating the processes of the system 
 
python vol.py -f centos.mem --profile=LinuxCentOS63x64 linux_pstree 
 
The output is a quite long list which can be further manipulated by piping the results to 
grep in order to produce a friendlier output. Checking information related to network 
connections and interfaces can be achieved by linux_netscan, linux_netstat, and 
linux_ifconfig respectively.  Another useful plugin when suspecting a malicious executa-
ble is linux_elfs which locates ELF binaries in process mappings. 
                                                
55 https://secondlookforensics.com/linux-memory-images/ 
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Figure 3-7, Locating ELF binaries via the linux_elfs plugin 
 
When performing malicious actions on a Linux system, an advanced use is well aware 
that every command she uses is stored in bash56 profile history and must take precautions 
in order to avoid this feature. Such precautions may be to manipulate the history file 
(HISTFILE)57 or when logging in via secure shell to use the T switch, which disables the 
pseudo-terminal allocation58. However even when some or all of these measures are 
taken, bash history can still be retrieved by Volatility since the commands have to exist 
at memory at some point. 
 
                                                
56 https://www.gnu.org/software/bash/ 
57 https://www.gnu.org/software/bash/manual/html_node/Bash-History-Facilities.html 
58 http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi/OpenBSD-current/man1/ssh.1?query=ssh 
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Figure 3-8, Retrieving bash history via the linux_bash plugin 
In this case the creator of a Linux rootkit[59] inserted it into the kernel and later hide it 
from lsmod59, a program used to show the status of modules in the Linux Kernel. Alt-
hough the creator of the rootkit was clever enough to hide its presence from user space 
[60], tools like Volatility which can analyse user space and kernel space, are able to detect 
it: 
python vol.py -f centos.mem --profile=LinuxCentOS63x64 linux_lsmod | grep rootkit 
 
 
Figure 3-9, Using linux_lsmod to detect loaded kernel modules 
 
There are cases though that the creator of the malware may hide its presence from lsmod 
even when kernel space is checked. For this kind of manipulations there is the sysfs file 
system [61], a virtual file system that exports information about various parts of the sys-
                                                
59 http://linux.die.net/man/8/lsmod 
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tem including hardware, kernel subsystems and everything related to device drivers. Vol-
atility has a Linux plugin dedicated to using sysfs for gathering all the modules loaded 
into the kernel[21][62]: 
 
python vol.py -f ubuntu.mem --profile=LinuxUbuntu1404x64 linux_check_module 
 
One more way for a malicious user to hide her activity is to hook systems calls like read, 
write, kill, etc. which can be traced via the linux_check_call plugin. 
 
Figure 3-10, Looking into system calls via the linux_check_call plugin 
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Table 3-2, Volatility Framework plugins dedicated to Linux 
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Table 3-3, Volatility Framework plugins dedicated to Linux 
 
As in the Windows case study, usage of a combination of plugins along with critical 
thinking can help a forensic analyst detect abnormal behaviour and dig further to pinpoint 
the root of the problem. 
 
3.5.3 OS X 
 
As in the previous case studies, most of the advanced malware targeting users of Apple’s 
operating systems operates only in memory to avoid detection and make its analysis 
harder, making Volatility Framework a crucial tool for the forensic analyst. 
  -47- 
There are a handful of plugins for process enumeration, like mac_pslist, mac_tasks and 
mac_pstree, which can be really helpful for detecting methods of malware persistence on 
OS X described by P.Wardle [63][64]. 
 
 
Figure 3-11, mac_tasks plugin provides a complete list of processes running on OSX 
along with attributes like PID, architecture and start time 
When a particular process is suspicious, an investigator can retrieve details like the 
memory mapping of said process by using the mac_proc_maps plugin and providing the 
PID 
 
Figure 3-12, Mapping of UserEventAgent process 
Moreover, mac_handles and mac_threads can provide an even deeper insight into the 
internals of a process. 
As in other operating systems, network activity is always a factor of high importance 
when trying to detect malicious behavior. Mac_netstat, mac_arp and mac_ifconfig are 
the equivalent plugins of linux_netstat, linux_arp and linux_ifconfig, printing the network 
interfaces and network related activity. 
There are also plugins like mac_adium and mac_contacts designed to extract information 
about the contacts of the user and his account registered to Adium, a popular instant mes-
saging program for OS X60: 
                                                
60 https://adium.im/ 
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Figure 3-13, Extracting OSX’s contact list with mac_contacts plugin 
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Table 3-4, Volatility Framework plugins dedicated to OS X 
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Table 3-5, Volatility Framework plugins dedicated to OS X 
In a recent paper presented in DFRWS 2015 by A.Case and G.Richard III [65], they in-
troduced a series of new Volatility plugins, designed for detecting advanced rootkits for 
Mac OS X,  a clear indication of the rapid expansion of The Volatility Framework but on 
the other hand, an strong clue of the unwanted attention the platform is attracting from 
malware authors. 
 
3.6 Bitcoin Malware Case Study 
 
Since its invention in 2008, Bitcoin has become the pinnacle of digital currencies [66]. 
One of the outcomes of this recognition was the increased attention of malicious users 
targeting legitimate users and their digital wallets. One of the ways a digital currency like 
Bitcoin differentiates from a physical currency, lies on the possible means of deception a 
legitimate user can be a victim of. Apart from stealing the actual Bitcoins, a malicious 
user can use the resources of a legitimate user (mining) to produce Bitcoins without the 
knowledge of the latter. This trend was on the rise until late 2013[6][7][4] but since 
Bitcoin mining has become uneconomic on home computers even if there is a collabora-
tion of thousands of them[5], nowadays there is a decline of those kind of activities with 
the occasional news story every couple of months[67][35]. 
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One of those illegal Bitcoin mining efforts in 2013 was spreading in Thessaloniki, Greece 
via USB sticks and later it passed the limits of the city and the country616263. The malicious 
file responsible is a portable executable targeting Microsoft Windows, which is renaming 
itself to random strings, based on the contents of USB drives it detects. Upon execution 
it is replicating to C:\Users\{Username}\AppData\Roaming as abab32.exe along with a 
copy of a file named sys32.exe, which is a way of trying to avoid drawing attention if 
examined via the task manager. More over, to achieve persistence, it creates a registry 
entry to HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run so 
as to execute every time the operating system reboots. While the first file turns out to be 
a legitimate Bitcoin miner64, the original executable that extracted abab32.exe and 
sys32.exe into the system, falls into the definition of malware; It sneaks two executables 
into the system, tries achieves persistence of execution by modifying the registry and 
camouflages its icon to a the one of a folder in order misguide the unsuspicious user into 
executing it. 
By reverse engineering the sample, a relationship diagram of its functions was produced: 
 
Figure 3-14, Functions of the malware after reverse engineering 
                                                
61 https://forums.malwarebytes.org/index.php?/topic/127472-remove-abab32exe-fold-
ers-turned-into-apps/ 
62 http://www.thelab.gr/topic/122166-abab32exe/ 
63 https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/systemcenter/en-US/457b9bd3-65ba-
4fbf-8fb3-35ee9357874f/appdataroamingabab32exe?forum=w7itprogeneral 
64 https://github.com/jgarzik/cpuminer 
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One of the most interesting functions of the malware highlighted in Figure 3-14 is min-
erInfo. After further analysis the source code of the function was available: 
 
 
Figure 3-15, Source code of minerInfo function 
The malware after executing it connects to a specific domain and port, using a combina-
tion of username and password, awaiting for either pushing the results of its mining or 
receiving data for further mining. 
Detection of this Bitcoin miner through Volatility relies on steps mentioned earlier in 
either of the case studies presented. Looking at the process list of the system via pslist, 
pstree or psscan and exporting suspicious processes to a file via procdump for further 
analysis like reverse engineering is one of the steps. 
 
Figure 3-16 Pstree plugin locating the malicious process 
 
Figure 3-17, Exporting to a file via procdump 
Moreover, examining everything related to network activity considering the nature of the 
malware and its need to connect to a server in order to operate, reveals a lot of information 
regarding its nature. By using netscan plugin a series of IPs are printed, information for 
whom can be obtained from sites like DNSstuff 65or IPduh66.  
                                                
65 http://www.dnsstuff.com/ 
66 http://ipduh.com/ 
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The username used by the miner in order to login to the remote server and the fact that 
the connection made were to IPs in Greece led to the identity of its creator, which resulted 
to an apology and seize of its operations[68][69]. 
 
3.7 Installation and setting up a test environment 
 
The Volatility Framework supports all three major operating systems, Microsoft Win-
dows, Apple OS X and Linux. In all cases there are two available means of installation; 
Building the framework from source code which is publicly available to everyone via 
git67, a version control system created by Linus Torvalds68, the creator of Linux, or using 
the binaries provided for each platform by the Volatility Foundation site69. If the user 
chooses the latter, the only prerequisite is Python 2.770, which for the Windows version 
is bundled into the installation executable. In the case of Linux and OS X, Pythons is 
already included into the operating system, thus simply running the binary is sufficient. 
Using the source code for installation might add some overhead when upgrading or unin-
stalling if one used the setup.py file, but on the other hand it provides more inside into the 
inner workings of the framework, giving the opportunity to a researcher for further inves-
tigation and development. 
In our case the test environment is based on OS X and Volatility Framework was installed 
via the source code, after downloading it via git and using the main Python file, vol.py: 
 
git clone https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility.git Volatility 
After cloning the source code from git, the Volatility directory shown in Figure 3-18, 
contains everything needed for executing the framework. Particularly for OS X, apart 
from the source code and the binaries provided by the Foundation, there is an additional 
way of installation; a third party, free and open-source package manager for OS X, Home-
brew71. Installation of Homebrew can be achieved via the terminal, with a single line: 
                                                
67 https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility 
68 https://www.britannica.com/biography/Linus-Torvalds 
69 http://www.volatilityfoundation.org/#!releases/component_71401 
70 https://www.python.org/download/releases/2.7/ 
71 http://brew.sh/ 
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ruby -e "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/master/install)" 
 
After this, Volatility can be installed by invoking Homebrew: 
 
brew install volatility 
 
In other words, Homebrew is the equivalent of the Apt package manager72 in Debian 
Linux and its derivatives. 
 
Figure 3-18, The Volatility Framework installation folder 
Cloning the source code from git to a directory of our choice and running the main Python 
file vol.py from that directory has the disadvantage of not being able to use Volatility as 
a library but on the other hand it is easier to execute, upgrade or test multiple versions of 
it. 
                                                
72 https://wiki.debian.org/Apt 
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Although Volatility can be used to analyse files without the installation of any other soft-
ware, there are packages that greatly enhance its abilities, with many of the plugins func-
tionality relying on them and are recommended for optimal results.  
 
• Distorm373 - A powerful disassembler library for x86/AMD64 architecture 
• Yara74 - A malware identification and classification tool 
• PyCrypto75 - The Python cryptography toolkit 
• PIL76 – a Python imaging library 
• OpenPyxl77 – A Python library for reading and writing Microsoft Excel files 
• Ujson78 - A JSON parsing library for exporting to HTML files 
 
Installation of the above additional open source software can be either achieved via their 
source code or for OS X and our case via the pip79, a package management system similar 
to homebrew but dedicated to software packages written in Python. Searching a package 
via pip is as simple as the following: 
pip search ujson 
resulting to: 
ujson                       - Ultra fast JSON encoder and decoder for Python 
ujson_delta             - A diff/patch pair for JSON-serialized data structures. 
SudokuJson2Pdf     - This project provides a tool which convert json file of 
                     sudokuinformation to pdf. 
drf_ujson                - Django Rest Framework UJSON Renderer 
ujsoncompare        - Json comparison tool 
 
Then, to install the desired package like ujson in our case: 
                                                
73 https://github.com/gdabah/distorm 
74 https://plusvic.github.io/yara/ 
75 https://www.dlitz.net/software/pycrypto/ 
76 http://www.pythonware.com/products/pil/ 
77 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/openpyxl 
78 https://pypi.python.org/pypi/ujson 
79 https://pip.pypa.io/en/stable/ 
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pip install ujson 
 
After completing the installation of all the recommended packages, the Volatility Frame-
work is armed to the max for analysing memory dumps. 
 
3.7.1 Memory Dumps 
 
Putting the Volatility Framework into practice requires the memory files that are to be 
analysed. Acquiring these files in some cases may not be a trivial task and may require a 
series of considerations and steps to be taken in order to preserve the evidence a forensic 
analyst is looking for. Following is a decision tree diagram for dealing with memory ac-
quisition and the decision one has to make, made by the creators of the framework [18]: 
 
Figure 3-19, Memory acquisition decision tree diagram 
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Apart from these factors mentioned in Figure 3-19, there are some more, equivalently 
important to be taken under consideration for memory acquisition:  
• Cost. Hardware solutions like CaptureGUARD80 or EnCase81 require thousands 
of US dollars but they have the advantage of being platform agnostic, as Carrier 
and Grand point out in their paper[70]. Software solutions like the Moonsols Win-
dows Memory Toolkit82 may cost way less or even be free of charge like 
Belkasoft’s Live RAM Capturer83. However, in this case memory acquisition on 
different platforms require a separate solution for each platform. 
• Timeline. Memory most of the times volatile. A successful acquisition does not 
guarantee that the artifacts required by a forensic analyst will be included in the 
memory dump, especially when the acquisition has to be achieved on a live sys-
tem. For example, when looking for the activity of a specific malware that com-
municates with its command and control server via UDP84, one has to acquire the 
RAM of the system when there is a connection with said servers in order for the 
information to be present in the memory dump. 
The Volatility Framework is a not a memory acquisition tool, nor does it contain on. 
However, it does support memory acquisition of up to 4 GB via Firewire for OS X and 
Linux, by taking advantage of a library85 
 
python vol.py –l firewire://forensic1394/<devno> plugin [options] 
 
where devno is the number of the device attached via Firewire. 
Following are some examples of software memory acquisition along with the tool used 
in each case. 
 
                                                
80 http://www.windowsscope.com/index.php?page=shop.product_details&flypage=fly-
page.tpl&product_id=29&category_id=3&option=com_virtuemart&Itemid=34 
81 https://www.guidancesoftware.com/ 
82 http://www.moonsols.com/#pricing 
83 https://belkasoft.com/ram-capturer 
84 User Datagram Protocol, a transport layer protocol 
85 https://freddie.witherden.org/tools/libforensic1394/ 
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For OS X, there is OSXPMem by Johannes Stuettgen[47] which works reliably for every 
major version of the operating system from 10.7 and onwards. 
 
 
Figure 3-20, OSXPMem directory contents and memory acquisition 
 
OSXPMem works without a problem for the x64 architecture but according to its devel-
oper it can also be compiled to work for the x86 architecture. 
For the Linux platform an open source solution for memory acquisition is Lime86 a 
loadable kernel module, introduced in 2012 by Joe Sylve[48]. To use Lime, we  have to 
build the module via make87 for the particular system which the memory acquisition will 
take place. Upon creating the module, we load it into the kernel with insmod88: 
 
sudo insmod lime-3.19.0-39-generic.ko “path=tcp:4445 format=lime” 
 
This way the operating system loads the module into the kernel and awaits for a TCP 
connection on port 4445 in order to send the contents of RAM to the remote system, in 
lime format. 
 
Figure 3-21, Lime module loaded into the Linux kernel 
                                                
86 https://github.com/504ensicslabs/lime 
87 https://www.gnu.org/software/make/ 
88 http://linux.die.net/man/8/insmod 
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To acquire the memory dump we connect to the system with netcat89 and dump the con-
tents into a file 
nc 192.168.169.131 > ubuntu.lime 
where 192.168.169.131 the IP of the target system and Ubuntu.lime the content of its 
memory. Since Ubuntu has most of ports closed by the kernel firewall, in order to connect 
to the target system we are required to open port 4445 using iptables90, a utility for con-
figuring the firewall: 
 
sudo iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport 4445 -j ACCEPT 
 
Using the above command, we configure the firewall to allow by default input connection 
at port 4445 using the TCP protocol. 
In Windows platforms there is a plethora of software solutions for memory acquisition. 
We used the Moonsols Memory Acquisition Tool mentioned earlier. More specifically, 
the edition we used is the Consultant Edition which on the contrary to the Free edition, 
supports both Microsoft Windows x86 and x64 architectures[46]. The toolkit contains 
five executables: 
• DumpIt.exe that works for Microsoft Windows XP, 2003, 2008, Vista, 2008 R2, 
7, 8 32-bits and 64-bits (x64) Edition. DumpIt can be used with scripts or/and 
batch files. It also provides an interactive mode for the acquisition of memory. 
• Hibr2dmp.exe and hibr2bin.exe which works with Microsoft Windows XP, 2003, 
2008, Vista, 2008 R2, 7, 8 32-bits and 64-bits (x64) Microsoft Windows hiberna-
tion files, including corrupted hibernation files. The produced file is hashed with 
the md591 algorithm. 
• Dmp2bin.exe which works with Microsoft Windows XP, 2003, 2008, Vista, 2008 
R2, 7, 8 32-bits and 64-bits (x64) Microsoft full memory crash dump files.  The 
produced file is hashed with the md5 algorithm. 
                                                
89 http://linux.die.net/man/1/nc 
90 http://linux.die.net/man/8/iptables 
91 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt 
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• Bin2dmp.exe that works with Microsoft Windows XP, 2003, 2008, Vista, 2008 
R2, 7, 8 32-bits and 64-bits (x64) raw memory snapshots (windd92, VMWare93). 
The produced file is hashed with the md5 algorithm. 
Although the Toolkit does not officially support the latest version of Microsoft’s operat-
ing system, it works as expected (Figure 3-22) 
 
Figure 3-22, Acquiring the memory of a Windows 10 x64 system 
As stated earlier, the Volatility Framework can analyze a series of file formats from RAW 
and lime files to Windows hibernation files and memory snapshots originating from vir-
tualization software like Oracle’s Virtualbox94 and VMWare’s Workstation95.  
Following are two cumulative tables of every memory image and file format that are 
supported by the Volatility Framework (Tables 3-6 and 3-7)  
 
 
 
                                                
92 A deprecated tool for memory dumping, http://forensicswiki.org/wiki/WinDD 
93 https://www.vmware.com/ 
94 https://www.virtualbox.org/ 
95 https://www.vmware.com/products/workstation 
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64-bit Windows Server 2012 and 2012 R2 32- and 64-bit Windows XP (SP2 and SP3)
32- and 64-bit Windows 10 (initial/basic support) 32- and 64-bit Linux kernels from 2.6.11 to 4.2.3
32- and 64-bit Windows 8, 8.1, and 8.1 Update 1 32-bit 10.5.x Leopard
32- and 64-bit Windows 7 (all service packs) 32- and 64-bit 10.6.x Snow Leopard
32- and 64-bit Windows Server 2008 (all service packs) 32- and 64-bit 10.7.x Lion
64-bit Windows Server 2008 R2 (all service packs) 64-bit 10.8.x Mountain Lion
32- and 64-bit Windows Vista (all service packs) 64-bit 10.9.x Mavericks
32- and 64-bit Windows Server 2003 (all service packs) 64-bit 10.10.x Yosemite
64-bit 10.11.x El Capitan
Supported memory images
 
Table 3-6, Supported memory images 
 
Firewire (IEEE 1394) 32- and 64-bit MachO files
Raw/Padded Physical Memory Virtualbox Core Dumps
Expert Witness (EWF) VMware Saved State (.vmss) and Snapshot (.vmsn)
32- and 64-bit Windows Crash Dump HPAK Format (FastDump)
32- and 64-bit Windows Hibernation QEMU memory dumps
Supported file formats
 
Table 3-7, Supported file formats 
For our research we implemented a series of virtual machines using VMWare’s virtual-
ization solution, Workstation and Fusion96, whose memory images formats, .vmsn (snap-
shots) and .vmss (saved states), can be analysed thanks to an open source python parser, 
vmsnparse97. It should be noted that there is one more related memory format, .vmem, 
which is similar to the RAW format. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
96 https://www.vmware.com/products/fusion 
97 https://code.google.com/p/vmsnparser/ 
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4 Chapter 4 - Design and Develop-
ment of a Volatility Framework 
Plugin 
4.1 Setting up the test bed 
 
Multiple Operating Systems are going to be tested in order to test and verify the function-
ality of the Volatility plugins and the respective malware samples.  
 
4.1.1 Operating Systems and Platforms 
 
Multiple virtual machines have been created and a number of snapshots of their states 
were generated. The virtualization software of choice is VMWare Workstation Pro for 
Linux and VMWare Fusion Pro for OS X. The host operating systems are Ubuntu 15.04 
x64 and OSX El Capitan, version 10.11.2. In total nine different virtual machines have 
been created. All are implemented for testing purposes and from their memory states 
samples are going to be acquired after infecting them with malware. For the analysis of 
the acquired samples, reverse engineering, coding and forensic analysis two physical sys-
tems are going to be used as test beds. 
The virtual machine created and used for testing purposes are: 
• Windows XP Pro SP3 x86 
• Windows 7 Pro N SP1 x86 
• Windows 7 Pro N SP1 x64 
• Windows 8.1 x64 
• Windows 10 Pro x64 
• Ubuntu LTS 14.04.01 x86 
• Ubuntu LTS 14.04.01 x64 
• OS X Mountain Lion (10.8.5) 
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The host systems used for the analysis are based on Ubuntu Linux 15.04 x64 and OSX El Cap-
itan, 10.11.2. 
Following are pictures of said virtual machines, along with their hardware specifications: 
 
 
Figure 4-1, Windows XP and Windows 7 x64 VMs 
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Figure 4-2, Windows 7 x86 and Windows 8.1 x64 VMs 
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Figure 4-3, Windows 10 and Ubuntu LTS 15.04 x64 VMs 
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Figure 4-4, Ubuntu LTS 15.04 x86 and OS X Mountain Lion VMs 
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4.1.2 Hardware Requirements 
 
Since virtualization software is the primary mean of research, hardware requirements of 
the test-bed must meat those of the software we are using, VMWare Workstation Pro and 
VMWare Fusion Pro. More specifically, for Workstation Pro hardware requirements98 
are a standard x86-PC with Intel and AMD processor. VMware recommends the follow-
ing: 
• 64-bit x86 Intel Core Duo Processor or equivalent, AMD Athlon 64 FX Dual Core 
Processor or equivalent 
• 1.3GHz speed or faster 
• 2GB RAM minimum, 4GB RAM and above recommended 
Workstation Pro installation requires: 
1.2 GB of available disk space for the application. Additional hard disk space required 
for each virtual machine, depending on the minimum requirements of the operating sys-
tem it hosts. 
For Windows DirectX 10 support in a virtual machine: 
• 3GB RAM (Host PC) 
• Intel Dual Core, 2.2GHz and above or AMD Athlon 4200+ and above 
• NVIDIA GeForce 8800GT and above or ATI Radeon HD 2600 and above 
 
For VMWare Fusion Pro the hardware requirements are the following99: 
• Any 64--bit capable Intel® Mac, compatible with Core 2 Duo, Xeon, i3, i5, i7 
processors or better 
• Minimum 4GB of RAM 
• 750MB free disk space for VMware Fusion and at least 5GB for each virtual ma-
chine, depending on the client’s operating system 
• Mac OS X 10.9.0 or later 
• Operating system installation media (disk or disk image) for virtual machines. 
 
                                                
98 https://www.vmware.com/products/workstation/faqs/install-requirements 
99 https://www.vmware.com/support/fusion/faq/requirements 
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The recommended graphics hardware for Windows DirectX 10 or OpenGL 3.3 support 
according to VMWare is equivalent to:  
• NVIDIA 8600M or better 
• ATI 2600 or better 
 
Regarding the hardware specifications of the clients, all virtual machines meat the mini-
mum requirements specified by the developers of each operating system. Moreover, due 
to antimalware techniques[71] [72] introduced to various modern malware, some hard-
ware features like the size of the hard disk are purposely set to values well beyond the 
requirements of the client operating system. One of the advantages of virtualization is the 
ability to change the hardware settings of the operating system on the fly or after a reboot, 
which in some cases, like the analysis of a malware anti-debugging and anti-virtualization 
techniques similar to the Tinba[73], is a valuable feature. 
 
4.1.3 Software Requirements 
 
The client machines are default installations of the operating systems, updated to the latest 
version via their respective update mechanisms. In each case the appropriate software 
solution for memory acquisition was installed100, so as to have the option of acquire the 
memory natively from inside the client, apart from the .vmss files prvided from 
VMWare’s software.  
For the host machines, Volatility Framework along with all the recommended packages 
was installed101. VMWare Workstation and Fusion as stated earlier were installed on both 
computers. Both products support all versions of Linux and Windows for client systems, 
however OS X is not supported by default. In order to run Apple’s operating system via 
VMWare Workstation or Fusion, we patched the them via an open source tool written in 
Python, Unlocker102.  
 
                                                
100 See Chapter 3, Memory Dumps 
101 See Chapter 3, Installation and setting up a test environment 
102 http://www.insanelymac.com/forum/files/file/339-unlocker/ 
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For research purposes, three samples of DevilRobber103, a Bitcoin malware for OSX, have 
been acquired thanks to Mikko Hypponen104, CRO of F-Secure and are used to infected 
the corresponding virtual machine. The MD5 hashes of the samples: 
 
  MD5 (mdsa.1) = 16e3bc0415056eb15b2752613970b79d 
MD5 (mdsa.2) = a123cc209802aa37cc62d23682e8cf8d 
MD5 (mdsa.3) = 9e22ceb19f397f8cd018f90c857ab638 
 
In order to test the functionality of a Volatility Framework plugin related to Bicoin, de-
veloped by Cem Gurkok[45] (see Appendix A), MultiBit HD105, a Bitcoin wallet was also 
installed. For the Windows platform two samples of BadMiner106 malware were investi-
gated for the same purposes. The MD5 hashes of the samples: 
 
         MD5 (BadMinerSample1.exe) = 0761d41068167c83047d06b89f497343 
MD5 (badminerSample2) = 6defe9a02352ddc0dba8f9949602c1d7 
 
For the Linux platform, two samples of a Linux malware that in 2014 was found to hav 
infected more than 31.000 devices that were running Linux, the Darlloz worm [74], were 
used. The MD5 hashes of the samples: 
 
MD5 (Darlloz sample 1) = df70db2fa08985c237892e83861bed50 
MD5 (Darlloz sample 2) = bd3870a568e1019797bff113c39ad3e0 
 
 
 
 
                                                
103 https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_osx_devilrobber_a.shtml 
104 https://mikko.hypponen.com/ 
105 https://multibit.org/ 
106 https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-081115-
5847-99 
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4.2 A Bitcoin plugin for the Volatility Framework 
 
The Volatility Foundation every year holds a plugins contest, for everyone to participate, 
awarding the top three plugins that are judged by them for their intuition, creativity and 
usefulness. In 2014 Cem Gurkok’s [45] plugin for finding Bitcoin addresses and keys of 
a specific Bitcoin desktop client, Multibit HD107 received an honorary mention. 
Upon examining said plugin source code (see Appendix A), we researched the possibility 
of expanding its features to more than locating artifacts of the aforementioned client. 
Firstly, we compiled a list of all the Bitcoin desktop clients for OSX, which are used 
worldwide and are endorsed by the top sites regarding Bitcoin in the world108. The list in 
no particular order: 
• Hive 
• Bither 
• Copay 
• Electrum 
• mSiGNA 
• ArmoryQt 
• Multibit HD 
 
Then we proceeded installing each one of them and examine their footprint on three of 
the latest versions of OS X; Mountain Lion, Yosemite, El Capitan. In all cases we focused 
on unique attributes that would help pinpoint the existence of the clients on the system in 
order to enhance the plugin mentioned earlier for detecting an analyzing them. There are 
many possible ways of doing so. One of them is by using Yara109, “a tool aimed at helping 
malware researchers to classify and identify malware samples”. By using Yara, we can 
examine the executables and create rules that can uniquely identify them. A sample rule 
that contains information regarding its creator and the pattern of strings that is used, fol-
lows: 
                                                
107 https://multibit.org/ 
108 http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Science/Social_Sciences/Economics/Finan-
cial_Economics/Currency_and_Money/Alternative_Monetary_Systems/Bitcoin 
109 https://plusvic.github.io/yara/ 
  -71- 
 
 
rule thesis_sample : sample 
{ 
    meta: 
        description = "This is an example" 
        thread_level = 5 
        in_the_wild = no 
 
    strings: 
        $a = {0A 00 00 30 90 00 00 8A 14 1D 90} 
        $b = {0F 5Q D0 0F CC 11 90 00 2B 9E FF E7 00} 
        $c = "TDGFOIHHNALMPQLOI" 
 
    condition: 
        $a or $b or $c 
} 
 
Another way of identifying unique properties in every client’s footprint is by examining 
the process listing. Every client has a unique process name tied to their actual name, mak-
ing it an ideal way of locating their memory. More specifically: 
 
• Hive is identified as Hive 
• Bither is identified as JWrapper-Bither 
• Multibit HD is identified as JavaApplicationS 
• Copay is based on node.js110 and should not be identified by the nwjs string alone.  
Coppay.app is used instead. 
• Electrum as Electrum 
• mSIGNA as mSigna 
• ArmoryGt as ArmoryQt  
 
Figure 4-5, All clients running and their identifiers 
                                                
110 https://github.com/nwjs/nw.js 
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In addition, we analyzed samples of three OS X malware families that can lead to back-
dooring a system and illegal Bitcoin mining, DevilRober111, Kitmos112 and Morcut113. 
Since their processes and executables are on purpose randomly created in order to avoid 
such a similar kind of detection, Yara was used to create rules that will help locate them. 
Creating a Yara rule can be achieved either by using the Python command line tool yar-
agenerator114: 
 
python yaraGenerator.py ../OSX/ -r DevilRobber -a "Giotis" -d "DevilRobber sample" -
t "OSX" -f "exe" 
 
or by using an automated service like yaragenerator.com. It is also possible to create them 
manually after reading the documentation, however the two solution mentioned are far 
more efficient when dealing with multiple samples. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
111https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_osx_devilrobber_a.shtml 
112https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-051616-5911-
99 
113https://www.sophos.com/en-us/threat-center/threat-analyses/viruses-and-spy-
ware/OSX~Morcut-A.aspx 
114https://github.com/Xen0ph0n/YaraGenerator 
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5 Chapter 5 - Evaluation of the 
proposed plugin 
 
In this chapter we are discussing the enhancements made to the Bitcoin plugin, along with 
the advantages and disadvantages they introduce. 
 
 
5.1 Analysis of the code 
 
Following is a snippet of code with the enhancements introduced (see Appendix A). 
 
def calculate(self): 
        all_tasks = pstasks.mac_tasks(self._config).allprocs() 
        bit_tasks = [] 
        btcclients = ['Electrum', 'Hive', 'JavaApplicationS', 'JWrapper-Bither', 
'Coppay.app', 'mSigna', 'ArmoryQt'] 
 
        try: 
            if self._config.PID: 
                pidlist = [int(p) for p in self._config.PID.split(',')] 
                bit_tasks = [t for t in all_tasks if t.p_pid in pidlist] 
            else: 
                i = 0 
                while i<len(btcclients): 
                    client2check=btcclients[i] 
                    name_re = re.compile(client2check, re.I) 
                    bit_tasks = [t for t in all_tasks if name_re.search(str(t.p_comm))] 
                    i=i+1 
        except: 
            pass 
 
        if len(bit_tasks) == 0: 
            yield (None, None) 
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The framework upon request will search the memory sample for one or all of the clients 
introduced in the list btcclients and check their memory space for structures indicating 
the presence of a Bitcoin wallet or key. 
For the malware samples referred earlier, a number of Yara rules where created for em-
bedding into the plugin, that will help detecting their existence in a memory sample. 
 
DevilRobber  
 
rule DevilRobber : OSX 
{ 
meta: 
    author = "Giotis" 
    date = "2015-11-10" 
    description = "OSX" 
    hash0 = "a123cc209802aa37cc62d23682e8cf8d" 
    hash1 = "16e3bc0415056eb15b2752613970b79d" 
    hash2 = "9e22ceb19f397f8cd018f90c857ab638" 
    sample_filetype = "exe" 
    yaragenerator = "https://github.com/Xen0ph0n/YaraGenerator" 
strings: 
    $string0 = "_read$UNIX2003" 
    $string1 = "content-length" 
    $string2 = "URLBase" 
    $string3 = "/usr/lib/dyld" 
    $string4 = "[FF02::C]" 
    $string5 = "_listen$UNIX2003" 
    $string6 = "_curl_global_init" 
    $string7 = "_close$UNIX2003" 
    $string8 = "_malloc" 
    $string9 = "__const" 
    $string10 = "rm -f s.txt" 
    $string11 = "_inet_addr" 
    $string12 = "presentationURL" 
    $string13 = "__common" 
    $string14 = "_recv$UNIX2003" 
    $string15 = "_curl_easy_init" 
    $string16 = "__DefaultRuneLocale" 
    $string17 = "_freeaddrinfo" 
    $string18 = "_strcmp" 
condition: 
    18 of them 
} 
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Kitmos 
 
rule Kitmos : OSX 
{ 
meta: 
    author = "Giotis" 
    date = "2015-11-10" 
    description = "Kitmos" 
    hash0 = "39faa22eb9d6b750ec345efcb38189f5" 
    hash1 = "d43dec59fa8e6629ff46ae9e56f698d8" 
    hash2 = "2e5345da904bba1c116b818fc9d5ab8f" 
    hash3 = "b3d49091875de190f200110c2f2032d4" 
    hash4 = "f9fabd1637d190e0e0a5c117c71921fc" 
    sample_filetype = "exe" 
    yaragenerator = "https://github.com/Xen0ph0n/YaraGenerator" 
strings: 
    $string0 = "m_nLoadedCount" 
    $string1 = " before " 
    $string2 = "addObject:" 
    $string3 = "/bin/sh" 
    $string4 = "m_ExtArray" 
    $string5 = "requestWithURL:" 
    $string6 = "m_nSavedMoment" 
    $string7 = "copyItemAtPath:toPath:error:" 
    $string8 = "N37CXSRXLD110/" 
    $string9 = "__TEXT" 
    $string10 = "121207052050Z" 
    $string11 = "removeAllObjects" 
    $string12 = "N37CXSRXLD1" 
    $string13 = "/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Ver-
sions/C/AppKit" 
    $string14 = "dictionaryWithObjectsAndKeys:" 
    $string15 = "TaskWrapperController" 
    $string16 = "NSWindow" 
    $string17 = "$Developer ID Certification Authority1" 
    $string18 = "/usr/lib/libobjc.A.dylib" 
condition: 
    18 of them 
} 
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Morcut 
 
rule Morcut : OSX 
{ 
meta: 
    author = "Giotis" 
    date = "2015-11-10" 
    description = "Morcut" 
    hash0 = "2c684cad7e75f17a57b6a6a1ca7198f3" 
    hash1 = "acec5f00057d3ec94849511f3eddcb91" 
    hash2 = "faab883598c8c379acfd0b9dccc93d0c" 
    hash3 = "7c3a2225792be3087d6e8c073cb8a58d" 
    hash4 = "8b08a91726ff8e4218af1336b4bf1f1d" 
    hash5 = "6f055150861d8d6e145e9aca65f92822" 
    hash6 = "59fe83e0ae12e085e0fa301ecca6776f" 
    sample_filetype = "exe" 
    yaragenerator = "https://github.com/Xen0ph0n/YaraGenerator" 
strings: 
    $string0 = "setKey:" 
    $string1 = "setSharedMemoryID:" 
    $string2 = "writeMemorybyXPC:offset:fromComponent:" 
    $string3 = "_getuid" 
    $string4 = "/usr/lib/libSystem.B.dylib" 
    $string5 = "/System/Library/Frameworks/Foundation.framework/Ver-
sions/C/Foundation" 
    $string6 = "/tmp/launchch-%d" 
    $string7 = "/usr/lib/system/libsystem_sandbox.dylib" 
    $string8 = "readMemory:fromComponent:" 
    $string9 = "mSemaphoreName" 
    $string10 = "fileExistsAtPath:" 
    $string11 = "initWithFormat:" 
    $string12 = "__NSConcreteGlobalBlock" 
    $string13 = "mAmIPrivUser" 
    $string14 = "mSharedMemoryID" 
    $string15 = "mSemaphoreID" 
    $string16 = "com.apple." 
condition: 
    16 of them 
} 
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5.2 Case study and evaluation of the plugin 
 
The enhanced plugin was tested against multiple instances of a virtual machine running 
OS X with Bitcoin clients installed. Following is a showcase of some of the results. 
 
The Hive Bitcoin client for desktop was one of the tests. A wallet was created and three 
Bitcoin addresses were used, two of whom are shown in Figure 5-1 that follows. 
 
 
Figure 5-1, The Hive Bitcoin client 
Running Volatility against the memory of the system resulted in all three Bitcoin ad-
dresses revealed to the investigator, as show in the following Figure 
 
Figure 5-2, Bitcoin addresses of Hive revealed 
-78- 
Moreover, apart from Bitcoin clients an investigator may a also search for other processes 
by adding the name of the process to the bccclients list. For example, the native applica-
tion of notes for OS X: 
 
Figure 5-3, A Bitcoin wallet address in Notes 
and the detection of the Bitcoin key by Volatility: 
 
Figure 5-4, Recovering an address from Notes 
Yara signatures are implemented in a similar way. Following is the snippet of code for 
detected the DevilRobber malware in a process115: 
bit_addrs = [] 
        devil_rule = yara.compile(sources = {'n' : 'rule r1 {meta: author = "Giotis" 
date = "2015-11-10" description = "OSX" hash0 = 
"a123cc209802aa37cc62d23682e8cf8d" hash1 = 
"16e3bc0415056eb15b2752613970b79d" hash2 = 
"9e22ceb19f397f8cd018f90c857ab638" sample_filetype = "exe" yaragenerator = 
"https://github.com/Xen0ph0n/YaraGenerator strings: $string0 = "_read$UNIX2003" 
$string1 = "content-length" $string2 = "URLBase" $string3 = "/usr/lib/dyld" $string4 = 
"[FF02::C]" $string5 = "_listen$UNIX2003" $string6 = "_curl_global_init" $string7 = 
"_close$UNIX2003" $string8 = "_malloc" $string9 = "__const" $string10 = "rm -f s.txt" 
$string11 = "_inet_addr" $string12 = "presentationURL" $string13 = "__common" 
$string14 = "_recv$UNIX2003" $string15 = "_curl_easy_init" $string16 = "__De-
faultRuneLocale" $string17 = "_freeaddrinfo" $string18 = "_strcmp" condition: 18 of 
them}'}) 
        for task in bit_tasks: 
            scanner = mac_yarascan.MapYaraScanner(task = task, rules = 
devil_rule) 
            for hit, address in scanner.scan(): 
                content = scanner.address_space.zread(address, 34) 
                    bit_addrs.append('DevilRobber detected!') 
 
                                                
115 The Yara rule for DevilRobber was created earlier, at Chapter 5.1 
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5.3 Strong and weak points of the implementation 
 
By expanding the list an investigator can virtually examine every process for artifacts 
associated with Bitcoin.  One can even implement Python’s regular expressions for de-
tecting random names usually associated with malware. This however would require a 
great amount of CPU resources and can be time consuming, making this a non-optimal 
solution for investigations where the systems used to perform the analysis are not state of 
the art from their CPU perspective. 
Yara rules for detecting malware are also an efficient way of dealing malware like Devil 
Robber that cannot be detected due to the random names it uses. Like in the previous 
case, they have the disadvantage of having to be updated along with the updates of the 
malware itself and their effectiveness is directly connected with the number of samples 
used for their generation: The merrier the better. 
A implementation in the plugin of both ways of detection for each process of interest,  
along with an update mechanism is the next step towards a more efficient way of per-
forming analysis focused on Bitcoin related processes.
 6 Chapter 6 - Conclusions 
 
Summary of the thesis and future development 
 
6.1 Summary 
 
For this thesis we examined the current state of malware and malware economy. We fo-
cused on a portion of malware programs, closely related to a recently introduced innova-
tion, digital currencies. We examined the current state of digital currencies, focusing at 
the predominant of them, Bitcoin, and compared it with other digital currencies. We in-
troduced the way it works, why is it considered by some the future of global economy. 
We also took a close look on how criminals are combining those two technologies, 
Bitcoin and malware, in order to locate and take advantage of both unsuspecting and ed-
ucated victims.  
We advocated on the need of digital forensics a section of forensics introduced officially 
in the early ‘80s, a lot later than the creation of computers and other forensic sciences. 
We debated on why memory forensics are a vital part of digital forensics and researched 
the inner workings of one of the cornerstone frameworks of memory forensics, the Vola-
tility Framework.  
We investigated the current state of plugins for the Volatility framework, and enhanced 
it by implementing a series of additions regarding Bitcoin related legitimate programs 
and malware, after inspecting a variety of them. Finally, we propose a series of improve-
ments that will further expand and advance the field of memory forensics against mal-
ware. 
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6.2 Contribution 
 
All the code created for this thesis along with future development, will be made available 
as an open-source project, in a public repository116 under the MIT Licence117 
 
6.3 Future Development 
 
 
Creating equivalent plugins for Windows and Linux is considered the top priority regard-
ing future development. Adding multithreading or multiprocessing futures to the plugin 
would greatly improve the experience of a forensic investigator who is working a home 
computer. Moreover, multiprocessing support will be the gateway to another improve-
ment that as of now is not cost and time effective; The examination for Bitcoin related 
artifacts in every process that is found in a memory dump, by automatically loading its 
PID into a list similar to the one introduced in the thesis and then separately analyzing 
them.  Furthermore, combining Yara  rules in the above scenario will result in an all 
around solution for detecting Bitcoin related malware.
                                                
116 https://github.com/GiotisD 
117 https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT 
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8 Appendix A 
 
Source code  
 
bitcoin.py 
# Volatility 
# Copyright (C) 2007-2013 Volatility Foundation 
# 
# This file is part of Volatility. 
# 
# Volatility is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 
# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License Version 2 as 
# published by the Free Software Foundation.  You may not use, modify or 
# distribute this program under any other version of the GNU General 
# Public License. 
# 
# Volatility is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 
# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the 
# GNU General Public License for more details. 
# 
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 
# along with Volatility.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. 
# 
 
""" 
@author:       Cem Gurkok 
@license:      GNU General Public License 2.0 
@contact:      cemgurkok@gmail.com 
@organization: 
""" 
 
import re 
import volatility.obj as obj 
import volatility.plugins.mac.common as common 
import volatility.plugins.mac.pstasks as pstasks 
import volatility.debug as debug 
import volatility.utils as utils 
import volatility.plugins.mac.mac_yarascan as mac_yarascan 
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try: 
    import pycoin.key as pykey 
    import pycoin.encoding as pyenc 
except ImportError: 
    print "You need to install pycoin for this plugin to run [pip install pycoin]"     
 
try: 
    import yara 
except ImportError: 
    print "You need to install yara for this plugin to run 
[https://github.com/plusvic/yara]" 
 
 
class mac_bitcoin(common.AbstractMacCommand): 
    """Get bitcoin artifacts from OS X multibit client memory""" 
 
    def  __init__(self, config, *args, **kwargs): 
        common.AbstractMacCommand.__init__(self, config, *args, **kwargs) 
        self._config.add_option('PID', short_option = 'p', default = None, help = 'Operate 
on these Process IDs (comma-separated)', action = 'store', type = 'str') 
         
    def calculate(self): 
        all_tasks = pstasks.mac_tasks(self._config).allprocs() 
        bit_tasks = [] 
 
        try: 
            if self._config.PID: 
                # find tasks given PIDs 
                pidlist = [int(p) for p in self._config.PID.split(',')] 
                bit_tasks = [t for t in all_tasks if t.p_pid in pidlist] 
            else: 
                # find multibit process 
                name_re = re.compile("JavaApplicationS", re.I) 
                bit_tasks = [t for t in all_tasks if name_re.search(str(t.p_comm))] 
        except: 
            pass 
 
        if len(bit_tasks) == 0: 
            yield (None, None) 
 
 
        # scan for bitcoin addresses with yara, 34 chars, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Address 
        # Most Bitcoin addresses are 34 characters. They consist of random digits and up-
percase  
        # and lowercase letters, with the exception that the uppercase letter "O", upper-
case  
        # letter "I", lowercase letter "l", and the number "0" are never used to prevent vis-
ual ambiguity. 
        bit_addrs = [] 
        addr_rule = yara.compile(sources = {'n' : 'rule r1 {strings: $a = /[1-9a-zA-
-90- 
z]{34}(?!OIl)/ condition: $a}'}) 
        for task in bit_tasks: 
            scanner = mac_yarascan.MapYaraScanner(task = task, rules = addr_rule) 
            for hit, address in scanner.scan(): 
                content = scanner.address_space.zread(address, 34) 
                if pyenc.is_valid_bitcoin_address(content) and content not in bit_addrs: 
                    bit_addrs.append(content) 
 
        # scan for bitcoin keys with yara, 52 char compressed base58, starts with L or K, 
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Private_key 
        addr_key = {} 
        key_rule = yara.compile(sources = {'n' : 'rule r1 {strings: $a = /(L|K)[0-9A-Za-
z]{51}/ condition: $a}'}) 
        for task in bit_tasks: 
            scanner = mac_yarascan.MapYaraScanner(task = task, rules = key_rule) 
            for hit, address in scanner.scan(): 
                content = scanner.address_space.zread(address, 52) 
                if pyenc.is_valid_wif(content): 
                    secret_exp = pyenc.wif_to_secret_exponent(content) 
                    key = pykey.Key(secret_exponent = secret_exp,is_compressed=True) 
                    if key.address() not in addr_key.keys(): 
                        addr_key[key.address()] = content 
                        yield(content, key.address()) 
 
        # addresses with no known keys 
        for bit_addr in bit_addrs: 
            if bit_addr not in addr_key.keys(): 
                yield ("UNKNOWN", bit_addr) 
 
    def render_text(self, outfd, data): 
        self.table_header(outfd, [("Bitcoin Key (Base58, compressed pub key)", 
"<52"),("Bitcoin Address","<34")]) 
        for key, address in data: 
            self.table_row(outfd, key, address) 
 
unlocker.py 
""" 
The MIT License (MIT) 
 
Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Dave Parsons & Sam Bingner 
 
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy 
of this software and associated documentation files (the 'Software'), to deal 
in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights 
to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell 
copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is 
furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: 
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The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in 
all copies or substantial portions of the Software. 
 
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED 'AS IS', WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EX-
PRESS OR 
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MER-
CHANTABILITY, 
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO 
EVENT SHALL THE 
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES 
OR OTHER 
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, 
ARISING FROM, 
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER 
DEALINGS IN 
THE SOFTWARE. 
 
vSMC Header Structure 
Offset  Length  struct Type Description 
---------------------------------------- 
0x00/00 0x08/08 Q      ptr  Offset to key table 
0x08/08 0x04/4  I      int  Number of private keys 
0x0C/12 0x04/4  I      int  Number of public keys 
 
vSMC Key Data Structure 
Offset  Length  struct Type Description 
---------------------------------------- 
0x00/00 0x04/04 4s     int  Key name (byte reversed e.g. #KEY is YEK#) 
0x04/04 0x01/01 B      byte Length of returned data 
0x05/05 0x04/04 4s     int  Data type (byte reversed e.g. ui32 is 23iu) 
0x09/09 0x01/01 B      byte Flag R/W 
0x0A/10 0x06/06 6x     byte Padding 
0x10/16 0x08/08 Q      ptr  Internal VMware routine 
0x18/24 0x30/48 48B    byte Data 
""" 
 
import os 
import sys 
import struct 
import subprocess 
 
if sys.version_info < (2, 7): 
    sys.stderr.write('You need Python 2.7 or later\n') 
    sys.exit(1) 
 
# Setup imports depending on whether IronPython or CPython 
if sys.platform == 'win32' \ 
        or sys.platform == 'cli': 
    from _winreg import * 
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def rot13(s): 
    chars = 'AaBbCcDdEeFfGgHhIiJjKkLlMmNnOoPpQqRrSsTtUuVvWwXxYyZz' 
    trans = chars[26:] + chars[:26] 
    rot_char = lambda c: trans[chars.find(c)] if chars.find(c) > -1 else c 
    return ''.join(rot_char(c) for c in s) 
 
 
def bytetohex(bytestr): 
    return ''.join(['%02X ' % ord(x) for x in bytestr]).strip() 
 
 
def printkey(i, offset, smc_key, smc_data): 
    print str(i + 1).zfill(3) \ 
          + ' ' + hex(offset) \ 
          + ' ' + smc_key[0][::-1] \ 
          + ' ' + str(smc_key[1]).zfill(2) \ 
          + ' ' + smc_key[2][::-1].replace('\x00', ' ') \ 
          + ' ' + '{0:#0{1}x}'.format(smc_key[3], 4) \ 
          + ' ' + hex(smc_key[4]) \ 
          + ' ' + bytetohex(smc_data) 
 
 
E_CLASS64 = 2 
E_SHT_RELA = 4 
 
 
def patchELF(f, oldOffset, newOffset): 
    f.seek(0) 
    magic = f.read(4) 
    if not magic == b'\x7fELF': 
        raise Exception('Magic number does not match') 
 
    ei_class = struct.unpack('=B', f.read(1))[0] 
    if ei_class != E_CLASS64: 
        raise Exception('Not 64bit elf header: ' + ei_class) 
 
    f.seek(40) 
    e_shoff = struct.unpack('=Q', f.read(8))[0] 
    f.seek(58) 
    e_shentsize = struct.unpack('=H', f.read(2))[0] 
    e_shnum = struct.unpack('=H', f.read(2))[0] 
    e_shstrndx = struct.unpack('=H', f.read(2))[0] 
 
    # print 'e_shoff: 0x{:x} e_shentsize: 0x{:x} e_shnum:0x{:x} e_shstrndx:0x{:x}'.for-
mat(e_shoff, e_shentsize, e_shnum, e_shstrndx) 
 
    for i in range(0, e_shnum): 
        f.seek(e_shoff + i * e_shentsize) 
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        e_sh = struct.unpack('=LLQQQQLLQQ', f.read(e_shentsize)) 
        e_sh_name = e_sh[0] 
        e_sh_type = e_sh[1] 
        e_sh_offset = e_sh[4] 
        e_sh_size = e_sh[5] 
        e_sh_entsize = e_sh[9] 
        if e_sh_type == E_SHT_RELA: 
            e_sh_nument = e_sh_size / e_sh_entsize 
            # print 'RELA at 0x{:x} with {:d} entries'.format(e_sh_offset, e_sh_nument) 
            for j in range(0, e_sh_nument): 
                f.seek(e_sh_offset + e_sh_entsize * j) 
                rela = struct.unpack('=QQq', f.read(e_sh_entsize)) 
                r_offset = rela[0] 
                r_info = rela[1] 
                r_addend = rela[2] 
                if r_addend == oldOffset: 
                    r_addend = newOffset 
                    f.seek(e_sh_offset + e_sh_entsize * j) 
                    f.write(struct.pack('=QQq', r_offset, r_info, r_addend)) 
                    print 'Relocation modified at: ' + hex(e_sh_offset + e_sh_entsize * j) 
 
 
def patchkeys(f, vmx, key, osname): 
    # Setup struct pack string 
    key_pack = '=4sB4sB6xQ' 
    smc_old_memptr = 0 
    smc_new_memptr = 0 
 
    # Do Until OSK1 read 
    i = 0 
    while True: 
 
        # Read key into struct str and data byte str 
        offset = key + (i * 72) 
        f.seek(offset) 
        smc_key = struct.unpack(key_pack, f.read(24)) 
        smc_data = f.read(smc_key[1]) 
 
        # Reset pointer to beginning of key entry 
        f.seek(offset) 
 
        if smc_key[0] == 'SKL+': 
            # Use the +LKS data routine for OSK0/1 
            smc_new_memptr = smc_key[4] 
            print '+LKS Key: ' 
            printkey(i, offset, smc_key, smc_data) 
 
        elif smc_key[0] == '0KSO': 
            # Write new data routine pointer from +LKS 
            print 'OSK0 Key Before:' 
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            printkey(i, offset, smc_key, smc_data) 
            smc_old_memptr = smc_key[4] 
            f.seek(offset) 
            f.write(struct.pack(key_pack, smc_key[0], smc_key[1], smc_key[2], 
smc_key[3], smc_new_memptr)) 
            f.flush() 
 
            # Write new data for key 
            f.seek(offset + 24) 
            smc_new_data = rot13('bheuneqjbexolgurfrjbeqfthneqrqcy') 
            f.write(smc_new_data) 
            f.flush() 
 
            # Re-read and print key 
            f.seek(offset) 
            smc_key = struct.unpack(key_pack, f.read(24)) 
            smc_data = f.read(smc_key[1]) 
            print 'OSK0 Key After:' 
            printkey(i, offset, smc_key, smc_data) 
 
        elif smc_key[0] == '1KSO': 
            # Write new data routine pointer from +LKS 
            print 'OSK1 Key Before:' 
            printkey(i, offset, smc_key, smc_data) 
            smc_old_memptr = smc_key[4] 
            f.seek(offset) 
            f.write(struct.pack(key_pack, smc_key[0], smc_key[1], smc_key[2], 
smc_key[3], smc_new_memptr)) 
            f.flush() 
 
            # Write new data for key 
            f.seek(offset + 24) 
            smc_new_data = rot13('rnfrqbagfgrny(p)NccyrPbzchgreVap') 
            f.write(smc_new_data) 
            f.flush() 
 
            # Re-read and print key 
            f.seek(offset) 
            smc_key = struct.unpack(key_pack, f.read(24)) 
            smc_data = f.read(smc_key[1]) 
            print 'OSK1 Key After:' 
            printkey(i, offset, smc_key, smc_data) 
 
            # Finished so get out of loop 
            break 
 
        else: 
            pass 
 
        i += 1 
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    return smc_old_memptr, smc_new_memptr 
 
 
def patchsmc(name, osname, sharedobj): 
    with open(name, 'r+b') as f: 
 
        smc_old_memptr = 0 
        smc_new_memptr = 0 
 
        # Read file into string variable 
        vmx = f.read() 
 
        print 'File: ' + name 
 
        # Setup hex string for vSMC headers 
        # These are the private and public key counts 
        smc_header_v0 = '\xF2\x00\x00\x00\xF0\x00\x00\x00' 
        smc_header_v1 = '\xB4\x01\x00\x00\xB0\x01\x00\x00' 
 
        # Setup hex string for #KEY key 
        key_key = '\x59\x45\x4B\x23\x04\x32\x33\x69\x75' 
 
        # Setup hex string for $Adr key 
        adr_key = '\x72\x64\x41\x24\x04\x32\x33\x69\x75' 
 
        # Find the vSMC headers 
        smc_header_v0_offset = vmx.find(smc_header_v0) - 8 
        smc_header_v1_offset = vmx.find(smc_header_v1) - 8 
 
        # Find '#KEY' keys 
        smc_key0 = vmx.find(key_key) 
        smc_key1 = vmx.rfind(key_key) 
 
        # Find '$Adr' key only V1 table 
        smc_adr = vmx.find(adr_key) 
 
        # Print vSMC0 tables and keys 
        print 'appleSMCTableV0 (smc.version = "0")' 
        print 'appleSMCTableV0 Address      : ' + hex(smc_header_v0_offset) 
        print 'appleSMCTableV0 Private Key #: 0xF2/242' 
        print 'appleSMCTableV0 Public Key  #: 0xF0/240' 
 
        if (smc_adr - smc_key0) != 72: 
            print 'appleSMCTableV0 Table        : ' + hex(smc_key0) 
            smc_old_memptr, smc_new_memptr = patchkeys(f, vmx, smc_key0, osname) 
        elif (smc_adr - smc_key1) != 72: 
            print 'appleSMCTableV0 Table        : ' + hex(smc_key1) 
            smc_old_memptr, smc_new_memptr = patchkeys(f, vmx, smc_key1, osname) 
 
        print 
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        # Print vSMC1 tables and keys 
        print 'appleSMCTableV1 (smc.version = "1")' 
        print 'appleSMCTableV1 Address      : ' + hex(smc_header_v1_offset) 
        print 'appleSMCTableV1 Private Key #: 0x01B4/436' 
        print 'appleSMCTableV1 Public Key  #: 0x01B0/432' 
 
        if (smc_adr - smc_key0) == 72: 
            print 'appleSMCTableV1 Table        : ' + hex(smc_key0) 
            smc_old_memptr, smc_new_memptr = patchkeys(f, vmx, smc_key0, osname) 
        elif (smc_adr - smc_key1) == 72: 
            print 'appleSMCTableV1 Table        : ' + hex(smc_key1) 
            smc_old_memptr, smc_new_memptr = patchkeys(f, vmx, smc_key1, osname) 
 
        print 
 
        # Find matching RELA record in .rela.dyn in ESXi ELF files 
        # This is temporary code until proper ELF parsing written 
        if sharedobj: 
            print 'Modifying RELA records from: ' + hex(smc_old_memptr) + ' to ' + 
hex(smc_new_memptr) 
            patchELF(f, smc_old_memptr, smc_new_memptr) 
 
        # Tidy up 
        f.flush() 
        f.close() 
 
 
def patchbase(name): 
    # Patch file 
    print 'GOS Patching: ' + name 
    f = open(name, 'r+b') 
 
    # Entry to search for in GOS table 
    darwin = ( 
        '\x10\x00\x00\x00\x10\x00\x00\x00' 
        '\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' 
        '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' 
        '\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' 
        '\xBE' 
    ) 
 
    # Read file into string variable 
    base = f.read() 
 
    # Loop thorugh each entry and set top bit 
    # 0xBE --> 0xBF 
    offset = 0 
    while offset < len(base): 
        offset = base.find(darwin, offset) 
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        if offset == -1: 
            break 
        f.seek(offset + 32) 
        flag = f.read(1) 
        if flag == '\xBE': 
            f.seek(offset + 32) 
            f.write('\xBF') 
            print 'GOS Patched flag @: ' + hex(offset) 
        else: 
            print 'GOS Unknown flag @: ' + hex(offset) + '/' + hex(int(flag)) 
 
        offset += 33 
 
    # Tidy up 
    f.flush() 
    f.close() 
    print 'GOS Patched: ' + name 
 
 
def patchvmkctl(name): 
    # Patch file 
    print 'smcPresent Patching: ' + name 
    f = open(name, 'r+b') 
 
    # Read file into string variable 
    vmkctl = f.read() 
    applesmc = vmkctl.find('applesmc') 
    f.seek(applesmc) 
    f.write('vmkernel') 
 
    # Tidy up 
    f.flush() 
    f.close() 
    print 'smcPresent Patched: ' + name 
 
 
def main(): 
    # Work around absent Platform module on VMkernel 
    if os.name == 'nt' or os.name == 'cli': 
        osname = 'windows' 
    else: 
        osname = os.uname()[0].lower() 
 
    vmx_so = False 
 
    # Setup default paths 
    if osname == 'darwin': 
        vmx_path = '/Applications/VMware Fusion.app/Contents/Library/' 
        vmx = vmx_path + 'vmware-vmx' 
        vmx_debug = vmx_path + 'vmware-vmx-debug' 
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        vmx_stats = vmx_path + 'vmware-vmx-stats' 
        vmwarebase = '' 
        libvmkctl = '' 
 
    elif osname == 'linux': 
        vmx_path = '/usr/lib/vmware/bin/' 
        vmx = vmx_path + 'vmware-vmx' 
        vmx_debug = vmx_path + 'vmware-vmx-debug' 
        vmx_stats = vmx_path + 'vmware-vmx-stats' 
        vmx_version = subprocess.check_output(["vmplayer", "-v"]) 
        if vmx_version.startswith('VMware Player 12'): 
            vmx_so = True 
            vmwarebase = '/usr/lib/vmware/lib/libvmwarebase.so/libvmwarebase.so' 
        else: 
            vmwarebase = '/usr/lib/vmware/lib/libvmwarebase.so.0/libvmwarebase.so.0' 
        libvmkctl = '' 
 
    elif osname == 'vmkernel': 
        vmx_path = '/unlocker/' 
        vmx = vmx_path + 'vmx' 
        vmx_debug = vmx_path + 'vmx-debug' 
        vmx_stats = vmx_path + 'vmx-stats' 
        vmx_so = True 
        vmwarebase = '' 
        libvmkctl = vmx_path + 'libvmkctl.so' 
 
    elif osname == 'windows': 
        reg = ConnectRegistry(None, HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE) 
        key = OpenKey(reg, r'SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\VMware, Inc.\VMware 
Workstation') 
        vmwarebase_path = QueryValueEx(key, 'InstallPath')[0] 
        vmx_path = QueryValueEx(key, 'InstallPath64')[0] 
        vmx = vmx_path + 'vmware-vmx.exe' 
        vmx_debug = vmx_path + 'vmware-vmx-debug.exe' 
        vmx_stats = vmx_path + 'vmware-vmx-stats.exe' 
        vmwarebase = vmwarebase_path + 'vmwarebase.dll' 
        libvmkctl = '' 
 
    else: 
        print('Unknown Operating System: ' + osname) 
        return 
 
    # Patch the vmx executables skipping stats version for Player 
    patchsmc(vmx, osname, vmx_so) 
    patchsmc(vmx_debug, osname, vmx_so) 
    try: 
        patchsmc(vmx_stats, osname, vmx_so) 
    except IOError: 
        pass 
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    # Patch vmwarebase for Workstation and Player 
    # Not required on Fusion or ESXi as table already has correct flags 
    if vmwarebase != '': 
        patchbase(vmwarebase) 
    else: 
        print 'Patching vmwarebase is not required on this system' 
 
    if osname == 'vmkernel': 
        patchvmkctl(libvmkctl) 
 
 
if __name__ == '__main__': 
    main() 
 
 
List of plugins included in Volatility Framework 2.5 
amcache                      - Print AmCache information 
apihooks                     - Detect API hooks in process and kernel memory 
atoms                        - Print session and window station atom tables 
atomscan                     - Pool scanner for atom tables 
auditpol                     - Prints out the Audit Policies from HKLM\SECURITY\Pol-
icy\PolAdtEv 
bigpools                     - Dump the big page pools using BigPagePoolScanner 
bioskbd                      - Reads the keyboard buffer from Real Mode memory 
cachedump                   - Dumps cached domain hashes from memory 
callbacks                    - Print system-wide notification routines 
clipboard                    - Extract the contents of the windows clipboard 
cmdline                      - Display process command-line arguments 
cmdscan                     - Extract command history by scanning for _COM  
MAND_HISTORY 
connections                  - Print list of open connections [Windows XP and 2003 Only] 
connscan                     - Pool scanner for tcp connections 
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consoles                     - Extract command history by scanning for _CONSOLE_IN-
FORMATION 
crashinfo                    - Dump crash-dump information 
deskscan                     - Poolscaner for tagDESKTOP (desktops) 
devicetree                   - Show device tree 
dlldump                      - Dump DLLs from a process address space 
dlllist                       - Print list of loaded dlls for each process 
driverirp                    - Driver IRP hook detection 
drivermodule                 - Associate driver objects to kernel modules 
driverscan                   - Pool scanner for driver objects 
dumpcerts                    - Dump RSA private and public SSL keys 
dumpfiles                    - Extract memory mapped and cached files 
dumpregistry                 - Dumps registry files out to disk 
editbox                     - Dumps various data from ComCtl Edit controls (experi 
mental: ListBox, ComboBox) 
envars                         - Display process environment variables 
eventhooks                    - Print details on windows event hooks 
evtlogs                             - Extract Windows Event Logs (XP/2003 only) 
filescan                          - Pool scanner for file objects 
gahti                                  - Dump the USER handle type information 
gditimers                              - Print installed GDI timers and callbacks 
gdt                                       - Display Global Descriptor Table 
getservicesids              - Get the names of services in the Registry and return Calcu-
lated SID 
getsids                                  - Print the SIDs owning each process 
handles                             - Print list of open handles for each process 
hashdump                          - Dumps passwords hashes (LM/NTLM) from memory 
  -101- 
hibinfo                            - Dump hibernation file information 
hivedump                        - Prints out a hive 
hivelist                           - Print list of registry hives. 
hivescan                          - Pool scanner for registry hives 
hpakextract                          - Extract physical memory from an HPAK file 
hpakinfo                         - Info on an HPAK file 
idt                               - Display Interrupt Descriptor Table 
iehistory                        - Reconstruct Internet Explorer cache / history 
imagecopy                 - Copies a physical address space out as a raw DD image 
imageinfo                        - Identify information for the image 
impscan                          - Scan for calls to imported functions 
joblinks                         - Print process job link information 
kdbgscan                             - Search for and dump potential KDBG values 
kpcrscan                              - Search for and dump potential KPCR values 
ldrmodules                       - Detect unlinked DLLs 
limeinfo                        - Dump Lime file format information 
linux_apihooks                   - Checks for userland apihooks 
linux_arp                           - Print the ARP table 
linux_banner                      - Prints the Linux banner information 
linux_bash                     - Recover bash history from bash process memory 
linux_bash_env                 - Recover a process' dynamic environment variables 
linux_bash_hash                 - Recover bash hash table from bash process memory 
linux_check_afinfo         - Verifies the operation function pointers of network pro-
tocols 
linux_check_creds              - Checks if any processes are sharing credential structures 
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linux_check_evt_arm             - Checks the Exception Vector Table to look for syscall 
table hooking 
linux_check_fop                 - Check file operation structures for rootkit modifications 
linux_check_idt                 - Checks if the IDT has been altered 
linux_check_inline_kernel      - Check for inline kernel hooks 
linux_check_modules         - Compares module list to sysfs info, if available 
linux_check_syscall                - Checks if the system call table has been altered 
linux_check_syscall_arm         - Checks if the system call table has been altered 
linux_check_tty                - Checks tty devices for hooks 
linux_cpuinfo                     - Prints info about each active processor 
linux_dentry_cache             - Gather files from the dentry cache 
linux_dmesg                      - Gather dmesg buffer 
linux_dump_map                   - Writes selected memory mappings to disk 
linux_dynamic_env            - Recover a process' dynamic environment variables 
linux_elfs                      - Find ELF binaries in process mappings 
linux_enumerate_files          - Lists files referenced by the filesystem cache 
linux_find_file                  - Lists and recovers files from memory 
linux_getcwd                    - Lists current working directory of each process 
linux_hidden_modules              - Carves memory to find hidden kernel modules 
linux_ifconfig                      - Gathers active interfaces 
linux_info_regs                    - It's like 'info registers' in GDB. It prints out all the 
linux_iomem                         - Provides output similar to /proc/iomem 
linux_kernel_opened_files        - Lists files that are opened from within the kernel 
linux_keyboard_notifiers           - Parses the keyboard notifier call chain 
linux_ldrmodules       - Compares the output of proc maps with the list of li-
braries from libdl 
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linux_library_list           - Lists libraries loaded into a process 
linux_librarydump                - Dumps shared libraries in process memory to disk 
linux_list_raw                  - List applications with promiscuous sockets 
linux_lsmod                     - Gather loaded kernel modules 
linux_lsof                     - Lists file descriptors and their path 
linux_malfind                 - Looks for suspicious process mappings 
linux_memmap                - Dumps the memory map for linux tasks 
linux_moddump                     - Extract loaded kernel modules 
linux_mount                - Gather mounted fs/devices 
linux_mount_cache           - Gather mounted fs/devices from kmem_cache 
linux_netfilter              - Lists Netfilter hooks 
linux_netscan                - Carves for network connection structures 
linux_netstat                - Lists open sockets 
linux_pidhashtable            - Enumerates processes through the PID hash table 
linux_pkt_queues                - Writes per-process packet queues out to disk 
linux_plthook                    - Scan ELF binaries' PLT for hooks to non-NEEDED im-
ages 
linux_proc_maps                   - Gathers process memory maps 
linux_proc_maps_rb          - Gathers process maps for linux through the mappings 
red-black tree 
linux_procdump                    - Dumps a process's executable image to disk 
linux_process_hollow             - Checks for signs of process hollowing 
linux_psaux                    - Gathers processes along with full command line and 
start time 
linux_psenv                   - Gathers processes along with their static environment 
variables 
linux_pslist                              - Gather active tasks by walking the task_struct->task list 
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linux_pslist_cache                 - Gather tasks from the kmem_cache 
linux_pstree                           - Shows the parent/child relationship between processes 
linux_psxview                        - Find hidden processes with various process listings 
linux_recover_filesystem       - Recovers the entire cached file system from memory 
linux_route_cache                  - Recovers the routing cache from memory 
linux_sk_buff_cache              - Recovers packets from the sk_buff kmem_cache 
linux_slabinfo                         - Mimics /proc/slabinfo on a running machine 
linux_strings                           - Match physical offsets to virtual addresses (may take a 
while, VERY verbose) 
linux_threads                     - Prints threads of processes 
linux_tmpfs                       - Recovers tmpfs filesystems from memory 
linux_truecrypt_passphrase    - Recovers cached Truecrypt passphrases 
linux_vma_cache                    - Gather VMAs from the vm_area_struct cache 
linux_volshell                    - Shell in the memory image 
linux_yarascan                  - A shell in the Linux memory image 
lsadump                           - Dump (decrypted) LSA secrets from the registry 
mac_adium                        - Lists Adium messages 
mac_apihooks                     - Checks for API hooks in processes 
mac_apihooks_kernel             - Checks to see if system call and kernel functions are 
hooked 
mac_arp                                 - Prints the arp table 
mac_bash                               - Recover bash history from bash process memory 
mac_bash_env                      - Recover bash's environment variables 
mac_bash_hash                     - Recover bash hash table from bash process memory 
mac_calendar                      - Gets calendar events from Calendar.app 
mac_check_mig_table             - Lists entires in the kernel's MIG table 
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mac_check_syscall_shadow    - Looks for shadow system call tables 
mac_check_syscalls                - Checks to see if system call table entries are hooked 
mac_check_sysctl                  - Checks for unknown sysctl handlers 
mac_check_trap_table         - Checks to see if mach trap table entries are hooked 
mac_compressed_swap            - Prints Mac OS X VM compressor stats and dumps all 
compressed pages 
mac_contacts                      - Gets contact names from Contacts.app 
mac_dead_procs                    - Prints terminated/de-allocated processes 
mac_dead_sockets                   - Prints terminated/de-allocated network sockets 
mac_dead_vnodes                   - Lists freed vnode structures 
mac_dmesg                         - Prints the kernel debug buffer 
mac_dump_file                     - Dumps a specified file 
mac_dump_maps            - Dumps memory ranges of process(es), optionally in-
cluding pages in compressed swap 
mac_dyld_maps               - Gets memory maps of processes from dyld data struc-
tures 
mac_find_aslr_shift          - Find the ASLR shift value for 10.8+ images 
mac_get_profile                   - Automatically detect Mac profiles 
mac_ifconfig                    - Lists network interface information for all devices 
mac_ip_filters                    - Reports any hooked IP filters 
mac_keychaindump        - Recovers possbile keychain keys. Use chainbreaker to 
open related keychain files 
mac_ldrmodules             - Compares the output of proc maps with the list of li-
braries from libdl 
mac_librarydump                  - Dumps the executable of a process 
mac_list_files                    - Lists files in the file cache 
mac_list_kauth_listeners      - Lists Kauth Scope listeners 
mac_list_kauth_scopes              - Lists Kauth Scopes and their status 
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mac_list_raw                 - List applications with promiscuous sockets 
mac_list_sessions            - Enumerates sessions 
mac_list_zones               - Prints active zones 
mac_lsmod                     - Lists loaded kernel modules 
mac_lsmod_iokit                - Lists loaded kernel modules through IOkit 
mac_lsmod_kext_map             - Lists loaded kernel modules 
mac_lsof                              - Lists per-process opened files 
mac_machine_info               - Prints machine information about the sample 
mac_malfind                        - Looks for suspicious process mappings 
mac_memdump                 - Dump addressable memory pages to a file 
mac_moddump                  - Writes the specified kernel extension to disk 
mac_mount                           - Prints mounted device information 
mac_netstat                  - Lists active per-process network connections 
mac_network_conns      - Lists network connections from kernel network struc-
tures 
mac_notesapp                      - Finds contents of Notes messages 
mac_notifiers           - Detects rootkits that add hooks into I/O Kit (e.g. 
LogKext) 
mac_orphan_threads     - Lists threads that don't map back to known mod-
ules/processes 
mac_pgrp_hash_table          - Walks the process group hash table 
mac_pid_hash_table               - Walks the pid hash table 
mac_print_boot_cmdline      - Prints kernel boot arguments 
mac_proc_maps                     - Gets memory maps of processes 
mac_procdump                 - Dumps the executable of a process 
mac_psaux                         - Prints processes with arguments in user land (**argv) 
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mac_psenv                    - Prints processes with environment in user land 
(**envp) 
mac_pslist                          - List Running Processes 
mac_pstree                   - Show parent/child relationship of processes 
mac_psxview                       - Find hidden processes with various process listings 
mac_recover_filesystem            - Recover the cached filesystem 
mac_route                       - Prints the routing table 
mac_socket_filters             - Reports socket filters 
mac_strings              - Match physical offsets to virtual addresses (may take a 
while, VERY verbose) 
mac_tasks                        - List Active Tasks 
mac_threads                            - List Process Threads 
mac_threads_simple                - Lists threads along with their start time and priority 
mac_trustedbsd                    - Lists malicious trustedbsd policies 
mac_version                        - Prints the Mac version 
mac_volshell                           - Shell in the memory image 
mac_yarascan                       - Scan memory for yara signatures 
machoinfo                          - Dump Mach-O file format information 
malfind                             - Find hidden and injected code 
mbrparser                         - Scans for and parses potential Master Boot Records 
memdump                          - Dump the addressable memory for a process 
memmap                            - Print the memory map 
messagehooks                      - List desktop and thread window message hooks 
mftparser                          - Scans for and parses potential MFT entries 
moddump                              - Dump a kernel driver to an executable file sample 
modscan                             - Pool scanner for kernel modules 
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modules                    - Print list of loaded modules 
multiscan                      - Scan for various objects at once 
mutantscan                 - Pool scanner for mutex objects 
netscan                         - Scan a Vista (or later) image for connections and sockets 
notepad                    - List currently displayed notepad text 
objtypescan                 - Scan for Windows object type objects 
patcher                    - Patches memory based on page scans 
poolpeek                   - Configurable pool scanner plugin 
pooltracker                  - Show a summary of pool tag usage 
printkey                     - Print a registry key, and its subkeys and values 
privs                          - Display process privileges 
procdump                      - Dump a process to an executable file sample 
pslist                    - Print all running processes by following the EPROCESS 
lists 
psscan                            - Pool scanner for process objects 
pstree                       - Print process list as a tree 
psxview                        - Find hidden processes with various process listings 
qemuinfo                     - Dump Qemu information 
raw2dmp                        - Converts a physical memory sample to a windbg crash 
dump 
screenshot                   - Save a pseudo-screenshot based on GDI windows 
servicediff                  - List Windows services (ala Plugx) 
sessions                       - List details on _MM_SESSION_SPACE  
shellbags                        - Prints ShellBags info 
shimcache                 - Parses the Application Compatibility Shim Cache registry 
key 
shutdowntime                  - Print ShutdownTime of machine from registry 
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sockets                           - Print list of open sockets 
sockscan                           - Pool scanner for tcp socket objects 
ssdt                                 - Display SSDT entries 
strings                            - Match physical offsets to virtual addresses  
svcscan                           - Scan for Windows services 
symlinkscan                        - Pool scanner for symlink objects 
thrdscan                             - Pool scanner for thread objects 
threads                              - Investigate _ETHREAD and _KTHREADs 
timeliner                           - Creates a timeline from various artifacts in memory 
timers                               - Print kernel timers and associated module DPCs 
truecryptmaster                    - Recover TrueCrypt 7.1a Master Keys 
truecryptpassphrase          - TrueCrypt Cached Passphrase Finder 
truecryptsummary            - TrueCrypt Summary 
unloadedmodules                   - Print list of unloaded modules 
userassist                          - Print userassist registry keys and information 
userhandles                        - Dump the USER handle tables 
vaddump                            - Dumps out the vad sections to a file 
vadinfo                              - Dump the VAD info 
vadtree                              - Walk the VAD tree and display in tree format 
vadwalk                        - Walk the VAD tree 
vboxinfo                           - Dump virtualbox information 
verinfo                        - Prints out the version information from PE images 
vmwareinfo                        - Dump VMware VMSS/VMSN information 
volshell                            - Shell in the memory image 
win10cookie                    - Find the ObHeaderCookie value for Windows 10 
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windows                                   - Print Desktop Windows (verbose details) 
wintree                            - Print Z-Order Desktop Windows Tree 
wndscan                           - Pool scanner for window stations 
 
List of out-of-the-box supported profiles in Volatility 
Framework 2.5 
VistaSP0x64                   - A Profile for Windows Vista SP0 x64 
VistaSP0x86                   - A Profile for Windows Vista SP0 x86 
VistaSP1x64                   - A Profile for Windows Vista SP1 x64 
VistaSP1x86                   - A Profile for Windows Vista SP1 x86 
VistaSP2x64                   - A Profile for Windows Vista SP2 x64 
VistaSP2x86                   - A Profile for Windows Vista SP2 x86 
Win10x64                        - A Profile for Windows 10 x64 
Win10x86                           - A Profile for Windows 10 x86 
Win2003SP0x86                - A Profile for Windows 2003 SP0 x86 
Win2003SP1x64                - A Profile for Windows 2003 SP1 x64 
Win2003SP1x86                - A Profile for Windows 2003 SP1 x86 
Win2003SP2x64                - A Profile for Windows 2003 SP2 x64 
Win2003SP2x86                - A Profile for Windows 2003 SP2 x86 
Win2008R2SP0x64            - A Profile for Windows 2008 R2 SP0 x64 
Win2008R2SP1x64            - A Profile for Windows 2008 R2 SP1 x64 
Win2008SP1x64                - A Profile for Windows 2008 SP1 x64 
Win2008SP1x86                - A Profile for Windows 2008 SP1 x86 
Win2008SP2x64                - A Profile for Windows 2008 SP2 x64 
Win2008SP2x86                - A Profile for Windows 2008 SP2 x86 
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Win2012R2x64                 - A Profile for Windows Server 2012 R2 x64 
Win2012x64                      - A Profile for Windows Server 2012 x64 
Win7SP0x64                      - A Profile for Windows 7 SP0 x64 
Win7SP0x86                      - A Profile for Windows 7 SP0 x86 
Win7SP1x64                      - A Profile for Windows 7 SP1 x64 
Win7SP1x86                      - A Profile for Windows 7 SP1 x86 
Win81U1x64                      - A Profile for Windows 8.1 Update 1 x64 
Win81U1x86                      - A Profile for Windows 8.1 Update 1 x86 
Win8SP0x64                      - A Profile for Windows 8 x64 
Win8SP0x86                      - A Profile for Windows 8 x86 
Win8SP1x64                      - A Profile for Windows 8.1 x64 
Win8SP1x86                      - A Profile for Windows 8.1 x86 
WinXPSP1x64                   - A Profile for Windows XP SP1 x64 
WinXPSP2x64                   - A Profile for Windows XP SP2 x64 
WinXPSP2x86                   - A Profile for Windows XP SP2 x86 
WinXPSP3x86                   - A Profile for Windows XP SP3 x86 
 
List of profiles for OS X and Linux maintained by the 
Volatility Foundation 
./Linux 
  4     136 Aug 14  2014 CentOS 
  4     136 Aug 14  2014 Debian 
  4     136 Aug 14  2014 Fedora 
  4     136 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE 
  4     136 Aug 14  2014 RedHat 
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  4     136 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu 
./Linux/CentOS 
  19     646 Aug 14  2014 x64 
  19     646 Aug 14  2014 x86 
./Linux/CentOS/x64 
1     363078 Aug 14  2014 CentOS50.zip 
 1     368281 Aug 14  2014 CentOS51.zip 
 1     405172 Aug 14  2014 CentOS510.zip 
 1     371250 Aug 14  2014 CentOS52.zip 
 1     377467 Aug 14  2014 CentOS53.zip 
 1     389625 Aug 14  2014 CentOS54.zip 
 1     393649 Aug 14  2014 CentOS55.zip 
 1     398150 Aug 14  2014 CentOS56.zip 
 1     400134 Aug 14  2014 CentOS57.zip 
 1     402681 Aug 14  2014 CentOS58.zip 
 1     404657 Aug 14  2014 CentOS59.zip 
 1     614767 Aug 14  2014 CentOS60.zip 
 1     628252 Aug 14  2014 CentOS61.zip 
 1     634384 Aug 14  2014 CentOS62.zip 
 1     637679 Aug 14  2014 CentOS63.zip 
 1     653417 Aug 14  2014 CentOS64.zip 
 1     673408 Aug 14  2014 CentOS65.zip 
./Linux/CentOS/x86 
 1     356003 Aug 14  2014 CentOS50.zip 
 1     360890 Aug 14  2014 CentOS51.zip 
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 1     391048 Aug 14  2014 CentOS510.zip 
 1     363549 Aug 14  2014 CentOS52.zip 
 1     369260 Aug 14  2014 CentOS53.zip 
 1     377998 Aug 14  2014 CentOS54.zip 
 1     381773 Aug 14  2014 CentOS55.zip 
 1     384813 Aug 14  2014 CentOS56.zip 
 1     386102 Aug 14  2014 CentOS57.zip 
 1     388581 Aug 14  2014 CentOS58.zip 
 1     390462 Aug 14  2014 CentOS59.zip 
 1     610104 Aug 14  2014 CentOS60.zip 
 1     623252 Aug 14  2014 CentOS61.zip 
 1     629071 Aug 14  2014 CentOS62.zip 
 1     637209 Aug 14  2014 CentOS63.zip 
 1     630904 Aug 14  2014 CentOS64.zip 
 1     649169 Aug 14  2014 CentOS65.zip 
./Linux/Debian 
  8     272 Sep 18 23:04 x64 
  7     238 Aug 14  2014 x86 
./Linux/Debian/x64 
 1     326904 Aug 14  2014 Debian40r9.zip 
 1     345487 Aug 14  2014 Debian5010.zip 
 1     503750 Aug 14  2014 Debian608.zip 
 1     626681 Aug 14  2014 Debian73.zip 
 1     626681 Aug 14  2014 Debian74.zip 
 1     750643 Sep 18 23:04 Debian8.zip 
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./Linux/Debian/x86 
1     305559 Aug 14  2014 Debian40r9.zip 
 1     358396 Aug 14  2014 Debian5010.zip 
 1     478922 Aug 14  2014 Debian608.zip 
 1     603489 Aug 14  2014 Debian73.zip 
 1     603394 Aug 14  2014 Debian74.zip 
./Linux/Fedora 
  18     612 Sep 18 23:04 x64 
  17     578 Aug 14  2014 x86 
./Linux/Fedora/x64 
 1     438498 Aug 14  2014 Fedora10.zip 
 1     495947 Aug 14  2014 Fedora11.zip 
 1     560676 Aug 14  2014 Fedora12.zip 
 1     591772 Aug 14  2014 Fedora13.zip 
 1     631149 Aug 14  2014 Fedora14.zip 
 1     676212 Aug 14  2014 Fedora15.zip 
 1     703578 Aug 14  2014 Fedora16.zip 
 1     687968 Aug 14  2014 Fedora17.zip 
 1     709434 Aug 14  2014 Fedora18.zip 
 1     726188 Aug 14  2014 Fedora19.zip 
 1     744548 Aug 14  2014 Fedora20.zip 
 1     836452 Sep 18 23:04 Fedora21Workstation.zip 
 1     357541 Aug 14  2014 Fedora7.zip 
 1     343550 Aug 14  2014 Fedora8.zip 
 1     322097 Aug 14  2014 Fedora9.zip 
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 1     361109 Aug 14  2014 FedoraCore6.zip 
./Linux/Fedora/x86 
 1     425125 Aug 14  2014 Fedora10.zip 
 1     513673 Aug 14  2014 Fedora11.zip 
 1     550376 Aug 14  2014 Fedora12.zip 
 1     579463 Aug 14  2014 Fedora13.zip 
 1     609058 Aug 14  2014 Fedora14.zip 
 1     658152 Aug 14  2014 Fedora15.zip 
 1     686090 Aug 14  2014 Fedora16.zip 
 1     666869 Aug 14  2014 Fedora17.zip 
 1     719916 Aug 14  2014 Fedora18.zip 
 1     724117 Aug 14  2014 Fedora19.zip 
 1     724596 Aug 14  2014 Fedora20.zip 
 1     366486 Aug 14  2014 Fedora7.zip 
 1     352493 Aug 14  2014 Fedora8.zip 
 1     360395 Aug 14  2014 Fedora9.zip 
 1     352060 Aug 14  2014 FedoraCore6.zip 
./Linux/OpenSUSE 
  13     442 Aug 14  2014 x64 
  13     442 Aug 14  2014 x86 
./Linux/OpenSUSE/x64 
 1     324375 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE102.zip 
 1     335823 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE103.zip 
 1     369578 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE110.zip 
 1     433928 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE111.zip 
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 1     549514 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE112.zip 
 1     568822 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE113.zip 
 1     629027 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE114.zip 
 1     708872 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE121.zip 
 1     694273 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE122.zip 
 1     715923 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE123.zip 
 1     746496 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE131.zip 
./Linux/OpenSUSE/x86 
1     319250 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE102.zip 
 1     341204 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE103.zip 
 1     359639 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE110.zip 
 1     416886 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE111.zip 
 1     527383 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE113.zip 
 1     605911 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE114.zip 
 1     672487 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE122.zip 
 1     693843 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE123.zip 
 1     721025 Aug 14  2014 OpenSUSE131.zip 
 1     620473 Aug 14  2014 OpenSuSE121.zip 
 1     485406 Aug 14  2014 openSUSE112.zip 
./Linux/RedHat 
  19     646 Aug 14  2014 x64 
  19     646 Aug 14  2014 x86 
./Linux/RedHat/x64 
 1     363080 Aug 14  2014 RedHat50.zip 
 1     368280 Aug 14  2014 RedHat51.zip 
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 1     405164 Aug 14  2014 RedHat510.zip 
 1     371243 Aug 14  2014 RedHat52.zip 
 1     377464 Aug 14  2014 RedHat53.zip 
 1     389626 Aug 14  2014 RedHat54.zip 
 1     393650 Aug 14  2014 RedHat55.zip 
 1     398169 Aug 14  2014 RedHat56.zip 
 1     400124 Aug 14  2014 RedHat57.zip 
 1     402631 Aug 14  2014 RedHat58.zip 
 1     404656 Aug 14  2014 RedHat59.zip 
 1     614783 Aug 14  2014 RedHat60.zip 
 1     628256 Aug 14  2014 RedHat61.zip 
 1     634384 Aug 14  2014 RedHat62.zip 
 1     643195 Aug 14  2014 RedHat63.zip 
 1     653442 Aug 14  2014 RedHat64.zip 
 1     673408 Aug 14  2014 RedHat65.zip 
./Linux/RedHat/x86 
1     356003 Aug 14  2014 RedHat50.zip 
 1     360889 Aug 14  2014 RedHat51.zip 
 1     391082 Aug 14  2014 RedHat510.zip 
 1     363548 Aug 14  2014 RedHat52.zip 
 1     369260 Aug 14  2014 RedHat53.zip 
 1     377998 Aug 14  2014 RedHat54.zip 
 1     381774 Aug 14  2014 RedHat55.zip 
 1     398169 Aug 14  2014 RedHat56.zip 
 1     386104 Aug 14  2014 RedHat57.zip 
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 1     388559 Aug 14  2014 RedHat58.zip 
 1     390461 Aug 14  2014 RedHat59.zip 
 1     610104 Aug 14  2014 RedHat60.zip 
 1     623267 Aug 14  2014 RedHat61.zip 
 1     629121 Aug 14  2014 RedHat62.zip 
 1     637224 Aug 14  2014 RedHat63.zip 
 1     630896 Aug 14  2014 RedHat64.zip 
 1     649151 Aug 14  2014 RedHat65.zip 
./Linux/Ubuntu 
  18     612 Sep 18 23:04 x64 
  18     612 Mar 29  2015 x86 
./Linux/Ubuntu/x64 
1     607331 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu10044.zip 
 1     648266 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu1010.zip 
 1     711829 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu1104.zip 
 1     732281 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu1110.zip 
 1     902974 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu12044.zip 
 1     711523 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu1210.zip 
 1     747224 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu1304.zip 
 1     861852 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu1310.zip 
 1     927103 Sep 18 23:04 Ubuntu1404.zip 
 1     311048 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu610.zip 
 1     322102 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu704.zip 
 1     322958 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu710.zip 
 1     338761 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu8044.zip 
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 1     410502 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu810.zip 
 1     523253 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu904.zip 
 1     598615 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu910.zip 
./Linux/Ubuntu/x86 
1     584694 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu10044.zip 
 1     623111 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu1010.zip 
 1     689118 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu1104.zip 
 1     706971 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu1110.zip 
 1     874175 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu12044.zip 
 1     691304 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu1210.zip 
 1     722911 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu1304.zip 
 1     833346 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu1310.zip 
 1     860071 Mar 29  2015 Ubuntu1404.zip 
 1     298760 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu610.zip 
 1     332330 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu704.zip 
 1     324667 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu710.zip 
 1     337231 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu8044.zip 
 1     384262 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu810.zip 
 1     500193 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu904.zip 
 1     575041 Aug 14  2014 Ubuntu910.zip 
./Mac 
  3     102 Sep 18 23:04 10.10 
  3     102 Oct 28 22:09 10.11 
  3     102 Aug 14  2014 10.5 
  4     136 Aug 14  2014 10.6 
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  4     136 Aug 14  2014 10.7 
  3     102 Aug 14  2014 10.8 
  3     102 Aug 14  2014 10.9 
./Mac/10.10 
10     340 Dec  3 15:14 x64 
./Mac/10.10/x64 
1     708106 Sep 18 23:04 Yosemite_10.10.2_14C1514.zip 
 1     710123 Sep 18 23:04 Yosemite_10.10.3_14D131.zip 
 1     710074 Sep 18 23:04 Yosemite_10.10.3_14D136.zip 
 1     712410 Sep 18 23:04 Yosemite_10.10.4_14E46.zip 
 1     574189 Dec  3 15:14 Yosemite_10.10.5_14F1021.zip 
 1     709131 Sep 18 23:04 Yosemite_10.10.5_14F27.zip 
 1     708559 Sep 18 23:04 Yosemite_10.10_14A389.zip 
 1     708559 Sep 18 23:04 Yosemite_10.10_14B25.zip 
 
./Mac/10.11 
1     745234 Oct 28 22:09 ElCapitan_10.11_15A284.zip 
./Mac/10.5 
9     306 Aug 14  2014 x86 
./Mac/10.5/x86 
 1     1250296 Aug 14  2014 Leopard_10.5.3_Intel.zip 
 1     1251524 Aug 14  2014 Leopard_10.5.4_Intel.zip 
 1     1249407 Aug 14  2014 Leopard_10.5.5_Intel.zip 
 1     1254176 Aug 14  2014 Leopard_10.5.6_Intel.zip 
 1     1152413 Aug 14  2014 Leopard_10.5.7_Intel.zip 
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 1     1154019 Aug 14  2014 Leopard_10.5.8_Intel.zip 
 1     1249320 Aug 14  2014 Leopard_10.5_Intel.zip 
./Mac/10.6 
  10     340 Aug 14  2014 x64 
  11     374 Mar 29  2015 x86 
./Mac/10.6/x64 
 1     1078398 Aug 14  2014 SnowLeopard_10.6.1_AMD.zip 
 1     1079186 Aug 14  2014 SnowLeopard_10.6.2_AMD.zip 
 1     1078169 Aug 14  2014 SnowLeopard_10.6.4_AMD.zip 
 1     1081130 Aug 14  2014 SnowLeopard_10.6.5_AMD.zip 
 1     1081198 Aug 14  2014 SnowLeopard_10.6.6_AMD.zip 
 1     1088625 Aug 14  2014 SnowLeopard_10.6.7_AMD.zip 
 1     1094384 Aug 14  2014 SnowLeopard_10.6.8_AMD.zip 
 1     1078398 Aug 14  2014 SnowLeopard_10.6_AMD.zip 
./Mac/10.6/x86 
 1     1081174 Aug 14  2014 SnowLeopard_10.6.1_Intel.zip 
 1     1082113 Aug 14  2014 SnowLeopard_10.6.2_Intel.zip 
 1     1078938 Mar 29  2015 SnowLeopard_10.6.3_Intel.zip 
 1     1081377 Aug 14  2014 SnowLeopard_10.6.4_Intel.zip 
 1     1084183 Aug 14  2014 SnowLeopard_10.6.5_Intel.zip 
 1     1083934 Aug 14  2014 SnowLeopard_10.6.6_Intel.zip 
 1     1091880 Aug 14  2014 SnowLeopard_10.6.7_Intel.zip 
 1     1097540 Aug 14  2014 SnowLeopard_10.6.8_Intel.zip 
 1     1081174 Aug 14  2014 SnowLeopard_10.6_Intel.zip 
./Mac/10.7 
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 8     272 Aug 14  2014 x64 
  8     272 Aug 14  2014 x86 
./Mac/10.7/x64 
 1     1205691 Aug 14  2014 Lion_10.7.1_AMD.zip 
 1     1206992 Aug 14  2014 Lion_10.7.2_AMD.zip 
 1     1206610 Aug 14  2014 Lion_10.7.3_AMD.zip 
 1     1209528 Aug 14  2014 Lion_10.7.4_AMD.zip 
 1     1210575 Aug 14  2014 Lion_10.7.5_AMD.zip 
 1     1205879 Aug 14  2014 Lion_10.7_AMD.zip 
./Mac/10.7/x86 
 1     1222054 Aug 14  2014 Lion_10.7.1_Intel.zip 
 1     1223954 Aug 14  2014 Lion_10.7.2_Intel.zip 
 1     1223590 Aug 14  2014 Lion_10.7.3_Intel.zip 
 1     1226080 Aug 14  2014 Lion_10.7.4_Intel.zip 
 1     1227728 Aug 14  2014 Lion_10.7.5_Intel.zip 
 1     1221746 Aug 14  2014 Lion_10.7_Intel.zip 
./Mac/10.8 
8     272 Aug 14  2014 x64 
./Mac/10.8/x64 
 1     1238687 Aug 14  2014 MountainLion_10.8.1_AMD.zip 
 1     1239024 Aug 14  2014 MountainLion_10.8.2_AMD.zip 
 1     1238934 Aug 14  2014 MountainLion_10.8.3_AMD.zip 
 1     1240705 Aug 14  2014 MountainLion_10.8.4_12e55_AMD.zip 
 1     1251778 Aug 14  2014 MountainLion_10.8.5_12f37_AMD.zip 
 1     1251712 Aug 14  2014 MountainLion_10.8.5_12f45_AMD.zip 
  -123- 
./Mac/10.9 
12     408 Dec  3 15:14 x64 
./Mac/10.9/x64 
 1     8365062 Oct 14  2014 10.9.5.64bit.symbol.dsymutil 
 1     1279883 Oct 14  2014 10.9.5.64bit.vtypes 
 1     1333931 Aug 14  2014 Mavericks_10.9.1_AMD.zip 
 1     1334545 Aug 14  2014 Mavericks_10.9.2_13C1021.AMD.zip 
 1     1334596 Aug 14  2014 Mavericks_10.9.2__13C64.AMD.zip 
 1     1335250 Aug 14  2014 Mavericks_10.9.3_AMD.zip 
 1     1335990 Aug 14  2014 Mavericks_10.9.4_AMD.zip 
 1     1291868 Dec  3 15:14 Mavericks_10.9.5_13F1077_AMD.zip 
1 1336065 Oct 21  2014 Mavericks_10.9.5_AMD.zip 
